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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The Military Backdrop
The Cold War goes on :

And the use of mi lita ry strength by the

United States as a backdrop to other forms of persuation --p olitical,
ideological, diplomatic, and economic--continues.

The use of a military

backdrop as an instrument of national policy will probably continue indefinitely because it is unlikely that the Soviet Union or Communist
China will change their objectives of expansionism; it is too much an

integral part of their ideo l ogy.

The easing of tensions between th e

United States and the Soviet Union since the Cuban crisis In 1962 is
perhaps an indication of a change in tactics and diplomacy, but it would
be naive to believe that the objective of a Communist-dominated world
has been forgotten.

Further, the dispute between Communist China and

the Soviet Union is not over the objective, but over the means of its

achievement, and over who will control the world-wide Communist movement.
The Buildup
As a res ult of the Unit ed States policy to present a strong military posture, there has been a constant bui ld up of strength ov er an extended
period si nce the Korean war.

First, this buildup manifested i t self in the

development of weapons systems such as the B-52 and B- 47 fleets and the
Atla s and Tital mis siles and th e Po l aris and its submari ne carrier, along
with some mid-range bal l i s tic missiles for deployment in Europe.

Dur i ng

this same period, the development of the century series (F-100, F-102,
F-104, and F-105) fighter aircraft also took place .

The most recent

major weapons development, which is currently being placed into the
military inventory at a rapid rate , is the Minuteman.

It is anticipated

that 800 Minuteman I missiles will be in place by June 1965. 1

Simultan-

eously , Minuteman II, an improved version, is being developed.
Similarly,

in the tactical area, funds are being expended on

the development of the TFX (F-111) aircraft, the F- 4 aircraft, and on
a Navy aircraft called the VAL.

In the counterinsu rg ency area, a devel-

opmental program is being established for a small aircraft capable of
operating from unprepared surfaces in approxima t ely 300 feet.

These are

only a few examples among the host of other programs for advanced weapons

systems which are currently being planned or already in being.
There has been, in fact, in the past three years, between 1961
and 1964, a substantial buildup in th e military strength of the United
States.

The major buildup has included :

(a) A 100 percent increase in

the number of nuclear weapons available to the strategic alert forces;

(b ) a 45 percent increas e in the number of combat - ready Army divisions;
(c) a 35 percent increase in tactical fighter squadrons; (d) a 60 percent
increas e in the tactical nuclear forces depl oyed in Europe; a nd ( e ) a

75 percent increase in air li ft capabi li ty . 2
1u.s. House of Representatives, Subcommittee of the Committee on
Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1965, Part 4,
Secretary of Defense, Chairman, Joint Chi efs of Staff, 88th Gong., 2d
Sess . (Wash ington, D. C., 1964), p . 30 .
2
Ibid ., p . 6 .

3
In addition to this buildup, constant improvements and modifica-

tions are being made in weapons which are already in the military inventory.

As an example, the 1964 program for modifications considered necessary to
improve the capability and to provid e for safety and materiel modifications
of the B-52 fleet amounted to $272.2 mi ll ion, and $296.2 million was requested for this same purpose for fiscal year 1965. 3

Similarly, the

F-105 aircraft will r equire $20 million for modification during fiscal
year 1965. 4

Further, most other in-place aircraft and missiles require

the expenditure of funds for capability improvement as well as for reasons
of safety.
The Expenditures

The development and the acquisition programs of major weapons
along with their deployment and manning, as well as their modification
and improvement programs and the required logistics support, has resulted
in an ever-increasing military budget.
i s revealed in Table 1 .

The extent of these expenditures

These ex pe nditures for military functions, as

a percentage of the gross national product, have remained quit e constant

at about 9 percent since 1955, although they increased from $35.8 billion
to $48 . 3 billion, a total of $13.5 billion, between 19 56 and 1963 .

Fur-

ther increases have occurred since 1962, as the annual military expenditures

for fiscal year 1965 are estimated at $51.2 billion, down from $52.3 for

3u.s. House of Representatives, Subcommittee of the Committee on
Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1965, Part 3,
Procurement, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington, D.C. , 1964 ), p . 73.

4

l£!£.,

p . 67.

4

Table 1.

Expenditures for Department of Defense military functions
as a percentage of gross national pr oduct, fiscal years

1939 - 1963 (billions of dollars)

Fiscal
year

Gr oss nationa l

product

De jz t. of Defense
Expenditu r es Percent of GN P

1939
1940
1941
1942
1943

88.2
95 . 7
110 . 5
140.5
178.4

1.1
1.5
6.0
23.6
62 . 7

1.2
1.6
5.4
16.8
35 . 1

1944
1945
1946
1947
1948

202.8
218.3
202.8
223.3
246.6

75.8
80.0
42.0
13.8
10.9

37.4
36.7
20 . 7
6.2
4.4

1949
1950
1951
1952
1953

261.6
263.8
310.8
338.8
359.7

11 . 6
11.9
19.8
38 . 9
43.6

4.4
4.5
6.4
11 . 5
12.1

1954
1955
1956
1957
1958

362.0
377 . 0
408.5
433.0
440.2

40.3
35.5
35.8
38.4
39.1

11.1
9.4
8.8
8.9
8.9

1959
1960
1961
1962
1963

466.7
494.8
506.6
539. 4
568.3

41.2
41.2
43.2
46.8
48.3

8.8
8.3
8.5
8.7
8.5

~:

U.S . Congr ess, Subcommi t tee on Defense Procuremen t of the
Joint Economic Committee, Background Materials on Economic Aspects of
Military Procurement and Supjzly--1964, 88th Cong. , 2nd Sess. (Washington, D.C., 1963), p. 3.

5

fiscal year 1964.5
The large expenditures for the defense programs of the United
States are bound to have an important impact on the economy- -l ocally,
nationally, and internationally.

Locally and nationall y , this effect

is intensified by the uneven geographic distribution of defense- r elated
industry and of mi litary activities, by the dispropor tionately large
claims made by the defense program on some occu pati onal specialties,

and by the rapidly changing composition of the defense program as technological innovations create the need for new weapons and facilities and
make obsolete the old .
Int ernationa ll y, the defense program has a significant impact on
the continuing deficit of the United States ba l ance of payments.

Since

1958, Lhe deficit in the total balance of paym ents has averaged well over
$3 billion annually.

The gold stocks of the United States declined by

almost $7.5 billion to a l evel of $15.6 billion, while liquid liabilities
to foreigners (a substantial part of which represents a potential claim

on the remaining gold stocks) rose by more than $9 billion to over $25
billion.

Al though defense expenditures are not the only, or even the

primary, factor causing the i nternational deficit, they amounted to $18
billion be tween 1958 and 1964, ave r aging a ppr oximately $3 billion a nnua lly . 6

5u.s. Senate, Subcommitt ee on Depar t ment of Defense, of the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on Armed Services, Department
of Defense Appropriations, 1965, Part I, Procurement Programs Requiring
Annual Authori zation, Research, Deve l opment , Test , and Evaluation Programs,
88th Gong . , 2d Sess . (Washington, D.C., 1964) , p . 6.
6u . s . Senate Committee on Armed Services and the Subcommittee on
De partment of Defense of the Committee on Appr op riati ons , Military Procu r ement Auth oriza tions, Fi sca l Year 1965, 88th Gong ., 2d Sess . (Washington,
D. C., 19 64 ), p. 28 .

6
Nationa l security expenditures, by virtue of the fact that they
are now so large and that th ey va r y in response to forces which are
independent of eco nomic conditio ns and policies, nec essa ril y exe rcise

a limit i ng inf lu e nce on the power of the federal government t o us e expenditure policy for the purp ose of promoting full empl oyme nt or achieving economic stabi lit y.
Further, any attemp t to use defense expend itur es as an instrument

of fiscal policy to create a level of demand adequ a te to keep the economy
healthy and growing wou ld pr obabl y prov e quite unwieldy and might also
int erfere with the attainment of a military posture consistent with the

national policy.
Becaus e expenditur es for the national defense approximat e 50 percent of the t o tal nati onal budg e t, a nd becaus e they have such a n impact
on our society, it is necessary to exami ne the environment of weapons

development and associated defense expendi tures and fully understand
some of the major implications involved.

Th e Pervasiveness

Of course, th e re are more than expenditures and dollars involved,

and the effects of defens e spending a r e all pervasive and affect all
major activities in the United State s.

In an effort to provide an under-

standing of some of the major implications and effects of expenditures
for the nati ona l defense th ere will be an examination of the following
major areas:
1.

The environment of weapons development and th e unique char -

acte r of the weapons market.

2.

The effect upon industry and its mode of doing business in

a market in which the gpvernment is the sole buyer.

3.

The impact on geographical areas .

4.

The problems of small business in defense procurement.

5.

The implications of government-sponsored research and develop-

ment on scientific and engineering manpower for industry, higher education,

and society at large.
In orde r to gain an insight into the uncertainties involved in the

development of majo r weapons sys tems, there will be an examination of the
problems involved in accurately predicting the costs, development time,
and the performance of these weapons.

It is an extremely unpredictable

business and the difficulties involved in accureately estimating the capabilities of a potential enemy add even more uncertainty to the environ-

ment of weapons development.
Because of the unpredictability involved and because the government is truly a monopsonist in the weapons market, a unique set of

government-industry relationships have been established which scarcely
resemble the buyer-seller associations common to the ordinary market

place.

Exploring this area will provide the many reasons for these

re l ationships.
There will also be a review of the changes

in the nature of

modern weapons systems, i .e. from ordnance-type wheeled weapons and other

conventional type weapons to missiles and to systems having great reliance
on electronics.

This change in the weapons product mix has resulted in

major changes in the location of those industries providing weapons products to the government, with major consequences for those areas bot h

8

gaining and l osing such industry.
Also because of these changes in the nature of weapons systems,

weapons contracts have had a tendency to be concentrated in the hands
of a relatively small number of larg e companies.
major imp l ications on

This has in turn had

small business concerns and the number of govern-

ment contracts they receive .

Aware of the possibilities of monopoly,

major programs have been estab lished by the government to assure that
small business receives an equitable share of expenditures for weapons
products.
In view of the large requirements for research and development
in the weapons industry, there have been major consequences for industry,
manpower, education, and a ll of society.

Many developments resulting

from military research have provided benefits to society at large through
civilian application.

However, there are many complaints that too much

effort is being applied to military research and development to the
detriment of economic progress in the civilian sector.
The great requirements for scientific and engineering manpower

for military research and development has had a major impact on education.
Further, the amount of military research and development, along with
other go v e rnmenta l r esea rch, ha s had its effec t on the universities.

A

searching analysis of this area will reveal the extent of these effects.
Alth ough not to be discussed, recognition must also be given to
the fact that the research and development programs associated with modern
weapons systems development has had great impact on automation, technology,
science, and engineering, and the introduction of new product s and pro-

cesses .

Further, it has had a lar ge impact on the educational curriculum

9
for scientists, engineers, and technicians, which must respond to the

changing technology being brought about by such research and development.

There will be no attempt to resolve the question of whether expenditures for weapons systems or whether other mi l itary outlays are
too great or too small; an answer to this question would require much

more time and space than is normally allotted to a thesis.
it is doubtful that this question can even be answered.

Further,

However, it

is hoped that a thorough examination of the areas briefly discussed in
the last several paragraphs will provide an insight into many of the
ramifications of modern weapons systems development and some of its

major effects on the American economy.

This thesis also pr oposes to

indicate, wherever appropriate , government react i on to the problems
and pressures resulting from the development of modern weapons systems .

10

CHAPTER II
THE BACKGROUND OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT
Uncertainty of Weapons Dev e lopment
There has been a high degree of uncertainty in the development
of modern weapons systems.

Uncertainty in this context, is defined as

the relative unpredictability of the outcome of a contemplated action
and is not meant to reflect the state of mind of the decision-maker.
The major uncertainties inv o lved

in the development of weapons systems

in the 1950's and early 1960' s are r ela ted to time, cost, and performance
factors.

Hajor development programs have often exceeded original cost

estimates by 200 to 300 percent and schedules have been retarded from
one to three years when compared with original predictions.

These

facts are well known to most government and industry managers who are
concerned with weapons systems development.

These uncertainties have been well documented.

The majo r find-

ings of two major studies of this problem are discussed in the following
paragraphs a nd sections .
ation1

These stud i es were prepared by the Rand Corpor-

and by Peck and Scher er 2

in their 3- year research project on

weapons acquisition.

lA. W. Harshall and W. H. Heckling, Pr edictability of the Costs,
Time and Success of Development, P-1821, Economics Division, The Rand
Corporation, Santa Monica, California, October 1959.
2Merton J. Peck and Frederic M. Scherer, The Weapons Acquisition
Pr ocess : An Economic Analysis (Boston: Division of Research, Graduate
School of Business Administration, Harvard Unive rsit y, 1962).

ll
In their study of 12 weapons systems, Peck and Scherer considered
three measures to ascertain the predictability or the unpredictability
of the outcome of weapons pr og rams .

They were:

(a) Development time,

or the interval between the start of a program and the availability of
operational weapons; (b) the costs development; and (c) quality, or the
expected performance of the resulting weapon.3

To determine the pre-

dictability of these variables, a comparison of the initial predictions
as documented in the pertinent contracts had to be compared with the
actual time, cost, and quality outcomes.

Some of the comparisons of time, cost, and quality outcomes with
their initial predictions had to be viewed with reservation because of

the problems involved in obtaining satisfactory data, for neither the
original estimates nor the final ouLcomes were quite comparable between
programs .

The fact that initial predi ctions were often made at varying

stages of progress of different weapons development programs presented
a problem .

In aircraft development programs, the development and produc-

tion of 5 to 15 prototypes had been sufficient to provide some reasonable
indications of the total anticipated development costs.

However, in many

missile programs the entire research and development effort (including
the production of initial prototypes) were not conta i ned in a single
contract.

Other factors causing difficulties in the comparison of pre-

dictions with actual outcomes were instances where only a specified

"level of effort" was required for each year and where no total development costs were specified.

Sometimes, programs were submitted for planning

purposes only and costs were deliberately understa t ed by contracto r s to

3Ibid., p. 19.
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"sell" the program.

Conversely, the military proponents of a particular

program submitted low cost and time estima tes to assure adoption of a

particular program.

Consequently, these estima tes could not be used as

a basis of comparison with the final ou tcomes of time and cost.4

A further problem encountered was the det e rmination of "initial
operational capability," a term which cannot be precisely defined.

Is

the definition of thi s term applicable to the availability of a single
operational missile or some larger number of missiles whose reliabilit y
is not exactly known?

The answer to this question is not easy.

Similarly,

the determination of final costs are not easily determined because the
extraction of precise costs from contractual documents may be made diffi-

cult by the inc lu sion of joint costs, overhead, and the lumping together
of production and development costs.

In addition, the reorientation of

programs numerous times for nontechnical reasons causes frustration of
time, cost, and performance data.

It was therefore necessary to intro-

duce some subjectivity to estimate

11

"actual'' outcomes in

original 11 predictions as well as

assessing the cost, time, and quality data in their

study of twelve major weapons systems development programs .
jective e l ement is ther efore pr ese nt in

This sub-

the prediction error data

reflected in Table 2 .
Despite th is subjectivity, the truth is that predictions have
been quite inaccurate.

As reflected in Table 2, it is not uncommon for

final costs to have exceeded es timates by 200 to 300 percent .

Further,

development time appears to have exceeded original estimates by as high
as 130 perc e nt--the average being about 36 percent.

4 Ibid.

l3

Table 2.

Development cost a nd time variance factors in twelve
we appns programs

Development
cos t factor 8

Program

Development
time fact orb

A
B

4.0

c

5 .0
2.0
n.a.
7.0
3.0
2.0
2.4
2.5
.7
3.0

1.0
2.3
1.9
n .a .
.7
1.8
1.3
1.0
1.3
1.3
1.0
1. 4

3.2

1.36

3.5

D

E
F
G
H

I
J
K
L

Average

RAc t ual cost divided by orig ina l cost estimate.
bActual time divided by original time e stimat e.
Source: Merton J. Peck and Frederic M.Scherer, The Weap ons Acquisition Proces s : An Economic Analysis (Boston: Division of Research,
Graduat e School of Business Administrati on, Harvard University, 1962),
p. 22.

Peck and Scherer f ound it difficult t o compile a comparable set
of fact o r s t o those con t ai ned in Table 2 for performance out comes of
weapons developmen t programs because of the qualitative nature attached
to these outcomes.

Their ana lysis of some key performance characteristics,

such as airspeed, range, al titude, and accuracy, for the twelve programs

reflected in Table 2 va ried from . 80 t o 2.00.

This indicated that actual

performance fluctuated from ap proximatel y 100 percent above to about 20
percent bel ow wha t was originally predicted.

Actual performance often

exceeded original predictions and the central tendency was on the favor-

able side .5
5rbid., p. 23.
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To combine the results reflected in Table 2 pertaining to time
and cost ou tcomes with those in th e previous paragraph related to performance variables. it can be seen that errors are greatest for cost

(only one program of the twelve cost less than estimated, while the
average cost factor was 3.2), l ess for time (average time factor was
1.36) and l east for performance.

In weapons development great impor-

tance has usually been attached to meeting performance and time requirements.

Cost, then, has traditionally been the factor with the greatest

variability because by the use of additional

funds, a development project

could be made to meet or exceed performance and/or time objectives.

This

has l argely been r esponsible for the greater unpredictability of the cost
dimension.

The s t udy by Marshall and Meckling

parallels the results con-

tained in th e Peck and Scherer study in many respects.
costs, th eir study indicated that

In regard to

in the early stages of development,

cost estimates were based on current design and the currently planned

program for development.

All costs are based on the proposed system and

its components as presently conceived and aggregated.

However, as

develo pment progresses, the initial plans and designs may c hange.

These

c han ges may be du e t o unforeseen technical difficulties, or because the
customer (military services) requires modifications to keep pace with

the changing intelligence of military capabilities, new operational
concepts, or new technological possibilities which require the addition
of numerous components and devices not original l y planned for .

The

weight, form, and size may differ tremendously at the completion of the
program.

Another complicating factor is that the number of test articles

15

which may have initially been designated at fifteen may have gone up to
forty - five by the end of the development program.

Such changes have

great effect on costs and have occurred quite frequently.

a

Consequently,

the costs finally incurred were not the cost of the initial design or
development plan, but the cost of what was finall y pr oduced or the cost
of whatever program was actually conducted. 6
Any development program will have a basic uncertainty attached
to it because of its nature.

A greater variability will exist in the

time, cost, and performance factors, the greater the technological

advance being sought .

For systems which demand many new ideas and major

improvements, the errors in cost predictions have tended to be larger.7

Marshall and Meckling ' s study shows that the cost variances were
greater for mi ssile programs which sought a higher order of advancement
than they were for flighter and bomber programs.

As shown in Table 3,

the original estimates of the cost of production for four cargo and
tanker programs showed an average factor of 1.2, or a variance of 20

percent, against an average factor of 6.4 and 4.1 .

This indicates var-

iances of 640 percent and 410 percent for the six missile programs which
were studied.

These two sets of factors (A and B) were prepared by two

differ ent individua l s.
Peck and Scherer also indicated that nume r ous external occurr e nce s

altered the course of developments programs with consequent effects on
cost and time predictions .

The major external causes are:

Ad vances in

technology, obsolescence, changing intelligenc e of enemy capabilities,

~arshall and Meckling, p. 6.
7Ibid ., p . 22.
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Table 3.

Total factor increases in average cumulative cost of pro-

duction {adjusted)
Cargoes
Fighters Factors Bombers Factors
and
Factors
A
B
_A
___B_ tankers A B
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

3.9
2.6
2. 0
1.5
1.7
1.2
1.0
1.0
1.1

4.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
2.1
1.2
.8
1.0
.6

Means

1.8

1.7

Means- -a 11 classes

2

3

A

3.2

6.2
2.8
1.1

4.0
2.8
1.2

3.4

2.7

2
3
4

1.4
1.5
1.0
1.0

1.6
1.5
.9
.8

1.2

1.2

Missiles

Factors

A
1
2
3
4
5
6

B

14.7
9.4
4.4
7.2
1.5
1.1

6 .4
6.0
2.7
7.1
1.3
.8

6.4

4.1

B

2.4

~:
A. W. Marshall and W. H. Meckling, Predi ctabi lity of the
Costs, Time, and Success of Development, P-18 21 , Economics Division,
The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, Oc t ober 1959, p. 14.

changes in defense policies, budget changes and fiscal reprogramming.

and changes of key officials. 8
In summary, these two studies ref l ect the basic inability of the
Department of Defense in the past to accurately estima t e and control
cost, time, and performance outcomes of major development programs.
The Department of Defense, however, recently has taken the view

that something can be done to reduce many of the uncertainties involved
in weapons systems development as reflected in the two studies which
have been reviewed.

The Department of Defense has indicated that poor

planning, unrealis tic schedules, unnecessary design changes, and large

8F or a full discussion see Peck and Scherer,

pp . 48 - 52.
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cost ove rruns have constantly disrupted the efficient conduct of development programs .

These difficulties have stemmed mainly from inadequate

planning and unwarranted haste in starting large -s cale development programs.

Sometimes even production was a difficulty, particulary before

a clear definition of what was wanted and before a clear determination
was made of a technological basis on which to develop a system.

Accord-

ingly, a discussion of the programs designed to overcome these deficiencies

will follow.9

The Need to Improve Planning
In view of the inability of the military services to adequately
predict and contro l time, cost, and performance factors, the Department

of Defense has taken the view that the basic defects were related to inadequate planning and the identical treatment of all development work.
The Department of Defense indicates that both government and
industry have believed that planning for innovation and invention could

not be accomplished.

Forced to operate under tight delivery schedules,

they have allocated large amounts of resources to projects without the
firm assurance of success and without giving adequate th ought to the
best method to achieve stated goal s.

Contracts for operational hardwar e

were l et before the feas ibilit y of accomplishing the bas ic technical
requirements had been established.

This type of planning was not con-

ducive to accurate pricing, and constant contingencies, changes, etc.,

prevailed throughout the live of the development. 10
9u.s. Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Department of Defense Appropriati ons for 1964, HR-779, 88th Gong., lst
Sess . (Washington, D. C. , 1963), pp. 73-74.
10u .s. Department of Defense, Incentive Contracting Guide (Washington, D.C ., 1963), p. l.
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Revising the Development Concept

In view of the large expenditures involved in research and develop-

ment (mace than $6 billion in fiscal yea c 1963), 11 the need of the
military services to have better control over their resources, and to
enable better planning and control over time, cost, and performance

factocs, the Department of Defense reorganized their concept of conducting
development wack.
Whereas in prior years development programs were treated as a

single, bcoad category, now they are subdivided into six categories:
"(1) research, ( 2) exploratory development, (3) advanced development, (4)
engineering development, (5) management support , and (6) operatio nal
system development . " l2

A brief description of the various categories of

development programs follows: 13
(1)

Research .

Include s effects toward increased knowledge of

natural phenomena and environment and efforts toward solving problems
in the physical, behavioral, and social science that have no clear

direct military application.
(2) Ex pl ocatocy development .

Aimed at solution of specific mili-

tacy problems , short of major developments.

Includes studies, investiga-

tions and minor development efforts.

(3)

Advanced development.

Aimed at development of hardware for

llu .s. Congress, Subcommittee on Defense Pr ocu rement of the Joint
Economic Committee, Background Materiel on Economic Aspects of Military
Procurement and Supply, 1964 , 88th Gong., 2nd Sess. (Washington, D.C.,
1964) , p. 27.
12u . s . Department of Defense, Instruction 3200 . 6, Reporting of
Research, Development and Engineecing Program Information {Washington,
D.C., 1962), enclosure 3, pp . l-2.

1~.
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experimental or operational test.

Items to be developed are for test

or experimentation as opposed to items to be developed for service use.

(4)

Engineering development.

Includes development programs to

be engineered for service--b ut still not approved for production or
operation.

(5)

Management and support.

Includes R&D effort in support of

installations or operations required for general R&D use.

Included are

such items as test ranges, military construction, maintenance support

of laboratories and operations maintenance of test aircraft and ships.
(6)

Op erational system development.

Full effo rt toward develop-

ment, engineering and test of systems, support programs, vehicles and

weapons that have been approved fo r production and use .
The first four of these categories are phases in which an evolutionary process takes plac e which translates ideas into useful military
hardware.
nique.

Each of the six phases above uses a different management tech-

The first two phases of research and exploratory development

generally do not prescribe goals, milestones, or schedules.

Control of

projects in these two categories is accomplished on a level-of-effort
basis.
A questioning in depth of th e pot entia l military value of s pecific
app li cations and techniques takes place in the third s tate (advanced
development) as ideas progress to the development of hardware for experi mental tests.

At the same time, costs of the most promising applications

are estimated to ascertain wh e ther the project, if fully developed and
plac ed into production and service , would be worth the cost.
During the fourth state (engineeri ng development) when a system
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is to be fully engineered for operational use, the necessary allocations
of resources are made to the applicable project.

Accordingly, before

full-scale development is begun, operational requirements and cost effectiveness of the system must be defined, and goals, milestones, and time
requirements must be firmed up.

At this point, a "project definition

phase" is required.l4
Project Definition
The "project definition phase," is defined as "a formal step
preceding full-scale development, during which preliminary engineering
and contract and management planning are accomplished in an environment

that encourages realism and objectivity. ,15
The "project definition phase" unites under a single plan for the
government and industry what is wanted, what the design will be, how it
is to be built, when it is wanted, and the cost of the development.

It

describes the management techniques to be used for control of the development.

After this pl an has been completed, initiation of the management

and support phase, and the operational systems development, follow as
time progresses.
The use of the "proj ect definition phase" would have to be und e rgone before any ''metal bending " was done.

Thus, a more pr ecise eva luation

of all aspects of the new development prior to a major commi tmen t of
14 Department of Defense Appropriations for 1965 , Part 4, Secretary
of Defense, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, p . 232.
l5u.s. Department of De fense, Directive 3200.9, Project Definition
Phase (Washington, D.C., 1964), p. 1.
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resources is made possib l e.

The number of costly projects can be

reduced which might otherwise require subsequent reorientation, stretching out, or termination.l 6

This approach recognizes that technological evo lution cannot be
planned.

Some of the research and development efforts in the ear l ier

phases will not lead to any useful products and some unanticipated needs
will be encountered along the way and some developme nt s will have to be

culled out .

Further, by the use of the first three pha ses as "building

blocks" to define and manage large scale programs, there will be a tendency to avoid costly and i nefficient crash programs and telescoped

development-production effo rts .l7
This approach of precisely defining exactly what i s want ed,

when it i s wanted, and how it will be controlled and managed is quit e
different than the approach taken in the past as ref le cted in the following stateme nt :
Contracts .

.

. are necessarily cost-plus-a-fixed

fee contrac t s , because no adequate basis exi sts for fixed
pric e negotiations . . . . We are demandi ng tomorrow what

was unheard of yesterday and where t he passage be t ween the
two is fi ll ed wit h unknowns, the costs of performance can-

not be est imat ed with r easonable accuracy.l8
The us e of "p rojected definition" is designed to ove r come the
16u . s. House of Re presentatives, Subcommittee of the Committee on
Appropriat ions, Departmen t of De fen se Appr opriations for 1964, Part 1,
88t h Cong ., 1st Sess . (Washington, D.C ., 1963), p. 161.
17Depa rtment of Defense Appropriations for 196 5, Part 4, Secretary
of Defe ns e, Chairman, Joint Chi e f s of Staf f, p. 232 .

18 u.s. Congress, Subcommittee on Def ense Pr oc ur ement of the J oint
Economic Commit tee, Impact of De fens e Procurement, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess .

(Washington, D.C ., 19 60), p . 326 . Statement by Perkins McGuire, former
Assistant Secr etar y of Def ense (Supply Log istics) .
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problems indicated in the above quote.

Its use in construction with

incentive type contracts will be discussed later in the chapter.

In

the next section there wil l be a discussion of cost -plu s - fixed-fee type
co ntracts, and the reasons for their widespread use in the pa st in major
development programs.
A Single Buyer:

Monops ony

There is but one ultimate consumer of advanced wea pons systems

in this country- -the Un it ed States Government.
quite unlike the consume rs

This type of market is

market with which we are familiar.

Alth ough

th e r e are entrepr e neur s in th e weapons business, the government o r buyer

generall y decides whether a new weapons system is requir ed, th e r e by taking
the initiat i ve on new pr od uc ts.

In addition, by th e use of progress pay-

ments and the provision of gove r nment facilities and equi pment , develop-

mental outlays have been largely financed by the buyer .

This precludes

the sel l er from offering a fi nished product which the buyer can accep t
or reject.

Instead, development costs have been provided by the buyer

before it is known what the ultimate performance or desirability of the
product will be.

The government ha s frequently changed, reduced , or

ca ncel l ed the program before its comple t ion .

Instead of a price determin-

a t ion by many buyers and sellers in the market, the price of th e wea pon
has been largely determined by cont ract or costs actually incurred, plus
a fee bargained for in advance (cost plus f ixed f ee contracts).
th ese methods reduce the risks taken by the seller .

Furt her,

These are the major

factors which pr ecl ude th e ex i stence of true market system in the weapons
industry. 19
19Pec k and Scherer, p . 60.
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The Administration of Weapons Systems Development

Because of the lack of a true consumers market, the government has

established an administrative substitute with a unique set of relationships
between it and the weapons systems industry.

This administration has pre-

dominantly taken the form of contracts known as cost - plus - fixed-fee in
the past.

Under this type of contract the corporation receives reimburse-

ment for all costs incurred in the development and production of weapons
systems, plus a fixed fee which has been determined in advance .

The major

reason for using this type of contract has been the difficulty in specifying exactly what is wanted in advance.
of contracting undertaken

This is in contrast to the type

when a co nt ract is· agreed upon for a specific

product or task, as is commonly done in ordinary comme r cial practice.

For the latter, it is entirely possible for compe tit ors to submit fixed
price bids, and the buyer and seller will agree upon the product before
it exists.

Under the former, where there is uncertainty regarding the

exact specifications of the end product, business is unable to assume

the risk of bidding on a fixed price basis, and government does not
expect industry to assume such risks.
Since a fixed price and exact detailed specifications canno t be
established

in advance for enti r e weapons sys t ems and because of the

large dollar amounts involved, the Military Services are placed into a
direct, daily int imate relationship with the developers and producers
of these systems .

There is little doubt that the Servi ces must, to a

considerable extent, contro l component design and development since
they are so critical t o the efficient performance of weapons systems.
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The Services, rather than the contractor, know what performance character-

istics are critical under combat conditions.

It is difficult to escape

the conclusion that considerable direct contact between the Services and
the pr oducers of components and equipment for weapons systems is necessary.
Weapons sys t ems development not only invo l ves considerable contact,
but also obvious l y involves a great deal of con trol over individual con tractors by government procurement agencies.

The Services frequently

place constraints on management which are not customary in the private

economy.

Some of these stem from the insistence that they control per-

formance characteristics and, therefore, design.

Some prime contracts

specify not only what is to be supplied but how--with what materials,
how much subcontrac ti ng, which subcontractors, and so on.

The cost-p lus

nature of these cont ract s requires the Services , prodded by the General
Accounting Office (GAO), to see that all incurred costs are "l egitimate."
A contracting officer enforces rules designed to prevent waste or fraud,

and approves or disapproves every items of expenditure by both prime
contractor and subcontractors.

and salaries to employees.

He even controls (in theory) the wages

This is somewha t r emoved from the term "free

enterprise" as the term is usually und erstood , and as it is practiced

elsewhere in the economy.20
The monitorship of large contracts is achieved through the use of
Air Force Pl ant Repres entative Offices.

A typical office might have 8

military pers onnel (offic ers ) and 142 civilian government employees; 27
civilians in

the Contra ct Division, 12 civilians in the Production

20 charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of Defense
in the Nuclear Age (Cambridg e, Mass.: Harvard University Pr ess, 1960),
p. 231.
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Division, 74 civilians in Quality Control Division , 10 civilians in the
Property Administration Division, etc.

Air Force auditors in the office. 21

There may also be 10 civilian

From the division tittl es, it is

obvious that costs, delivery schedules, quality performance, etc., are

monitored very closely--intimately and constantly by government representatives.

The property function exists to monitor government industrial

property and government-furnished parts purchased from other contractors,

which are often pr ovided on large contracts.
Industry, to a g reat extent, would like to have many of the constraints removed in their government contracts.

But the Congress and

the General Accounting Office, because of the huge expenditures involved,
are constantly reviewing the Service ' s procurement practices, and through

constant prodding the rules appear to be tightening.

An idea of the

magnitud e of these expenditure s may be gleaned from the following figures
for only two weapons in the nation's arsenal.

The amounts expended on

the Atlas program to date are $3.9 billion, with f inal costs estimated
at $5.2 billion, while the Minuteman estimate is $5.5 billion.22
The public view regarding contractor surveillance is summarized

as follows:
The relaxation of con tractual restraints, whi l e highly desirable in itself, depends upon the development of satisfactory
21 u.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on the Committee
on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1957, Pr ocurement Policies and Pra ctices of the De partment of Defense, 84th Cong.,
2nd Sess. (Washington, D.C., 1946), p. 119 .
22u.s. Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the
Committee on Government Operations, Pyramiding of Profits and Costs in
the Missile Pr ocurement Program , Part 3 (Atlas Program), 87th Cong., 2nd
Sess. (Washington, D.C . , 1962), p. 572.
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substitutes for "cost plus." Rightly or wrongly (we think
rightl y), the Congress and the public are determined that
contractors be kept from cheating on cost -plus, even to

the point of being willing to sacrifice some efficiency
to prevent fraud ( or just excessive pocketlining).23
In regard to po cke t-lining, a maj or tool being us ed by Congress
and the Services to ascertain the appropriateness of contract charges
is the audit procedure.

Congress, through the use of the General Account-

ing Office, has audited many contracts and disclosed numerous instances
of overcharges by weapons contractors and subcontractors.

A recent dis-

closure by this instrument of Congress asserted that Melpar Inc., which
was deve loping a B-58 aircraft bomber recording system, charged the Air
Force a price which exceeded incurred costs by $821,200, or 41 percent.
This resulted in a detailed audit and negotiation of price adjustments
between the Air Force and Melpar.24
Routinely, the Services audit their contracts, and many audits
result in re-negotiated prices and recovery of charges from contractors.

In fiscal year 1962, the Air Force negotiated price reductions in the
amount of $438 million as a result of 228 audits; in fiscal year 1963
this total was $487 million for 250 audits.

During these two years

there were 10,809 contractors and subcontractor ' s cost estimates sub-

j ected to Air Force audit review.25
In addition to the constraints of cost-reimbursement- type contracts

upon industry, the following disadvantages to their use are summarized in
this statement by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and
Logistics ) .
23Hitch, p. 233.
24De partment of Defense Appropriations for 1965, Pa rt 3 , Procurement,
p . 18 .

25 Ibid ., p . 24.
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This t ype of contract has well-known disadvantages.
It provides little or no incentive for private managers
to reduce costs o r otherwise improve efficiency. Indeed ,
the cost-plus - fixed fee contract in combination with strong
pressures from governmental managers to accomplish work on

a rapid time schedule, probably pr ovides incentives for
raising rather than for reducing costs. If a corporation
is judged in terms of whether it accomplishes a result by
a given d eadline rather than by whether it accomplishes
that result at minimum cost, it will naturally pay less
attention to costs and more attention to speed of accomplishment. On the other hand, where there is no given
deadline and cost-plus-fixed - fee contrac t, it may serve

to prolong the research and development work and induce the
contractor to dela y completion.26

Incentive Contracts

Due to the widespread dissatisfaction with cost-plus-fixed-fee
contracts, the Department of Defense ha s been promoting the use of

incentive-type con tracts .

The incentive principle holds, in brief,

that a contractor should be motivated, in calculable monetary terms:
(l) To turn out a product that meets significantly
advanced performance goals, (2) to improve on the contract
schedule up to and including final delivery, (3) to substantially reduce the costs of the work, or (4) to complete
the project under a weighted combination of some or all of
these objec tives.27
If the government can precisely define its objectives requirements, time tables and management controls through the application of
"project definition, '' it will probably enab l e the greater use of incent i ve -

type contracts.

By taking the time to closely plan all facets of a develop-

ment project, the ability to establish realistic targets for use
26 u.s. House of Representatives, Subcommittee of the Committee on
Government Operations, Systems Development and Management, Part 2, 87th
Cong., 2nd Sess. (Washington, D.C. 1962), p. 551 .
2 7Incentive Contracting Guide, p. 1.
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with incentive-type contracts shou ld be improved.

In addition, the

Department of Defense has begun to implement o ther management controls
and are making them an integral part of contracts which must be defined
and spelled out during the "project definition " phase.

These techniques

along with a precise definition of goals and targets should help improve
the predi ctabi lit y of the cost, time, and performance factors which have
caused major problems in the past.
In essence, nearly all incentives take the form of a sharing
arrangement, expressed as a percentage ratio.

As an example, if a

60/40 cost sharing arrangement was agreed upon, the government would pay
60 cents and the contractor 40 cents of every dollar by which actual
costs increased.

Conversely, for every dollar saved , the governme nt

would retain 60 cents, and the contractor ' s profit {or fee ) would increase by 40 cents .

In other words, over the range of costs where the

sharing formula is applicabl e, the contractor mus t look at every do llar

he spends as though 40 cents were his .

His profits are thus tuned to

the contractor over a variable on whi ch his management skills can have

a significant effect.

Ince ntiv e patterns may also be established for

equipment performance as well; specific standards must be esta blished
for these performance goa l s a l ong with predetermined t es t procedures.
The incentive targets can be tied into such characteris ti cs as speed ,

range, payload, or maneuverability.

Delivery incentives may be related

t o end-item delivery, test completions, or possibly only the acce p tance
of th e first prototype.28
There are t wo basic t ypes of incentive contracts .
28 Ibid., p . 10.

They are known
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as the fixed-price-incentive-firm contract and the cost - plus-incentive-

fee contract.

Under the first type of contract, the gove rnment and the

contractor must negotiate four basic elements.

These are:

l.

Target cost (a gain st which to measure final costs).

2.

Target pr ofit (a reasonable profit for the work at
target cost).

3.

Ceiling price (th e total dollar amount for which the
government is liable).

4.

Sharing formula (the arrangement for establishing final
profit and price).29

Upon completion of the work, the contractor and the government negotiate
the final costs, sharing the overruns or underruns based on th e agreed upon formula.

To illustrate, assume that the target cost is $100,000,

the target profit $10,000, the pric e ceiling $118,000, and th e sharing
formula is 75 percent for the government and 25 percent for the contractor.
Under this formula, the contractor would keep 25 percent of every dollar
saved.

In order to earn a profit of $12,000, he wou ld have to reduc e

costs by $8,000 below target, or down to $92,000.

Since there is no

profit ceili ng, profits cou ld increase indefinitely as the dollar underrun increased.

Conversely, a n overrun of $8,000 above target cost would

reduce his profit to $8,000.

With an overrun of $18,000 he would los e

money, since this t ype contract does not provide for a mi nimum profit.

Regardless of final contractor cost, the gove rnment's liability cannot
exceed $118 ,000, and the contractual specifications must be met.
The cost -p lus-incentive- fee contract uses the same type of sharing
formu la as the fixed-price-incentive-firm contract.

The formula determines

the fee payable to the cont r actor on the basis of the r elation between
29 Ib id., p . 11.
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target costs and total allowable costs.

In contrast to the fixed-price-

incentive -firm contract, where no floor or ceiling profit is negotiated,

this type contract states the minimum and maximum fees allowable. In
development contracts, the maximum is limited to 15 percent of the target
cost and on production contracts it is limited to 10 percent.

In this

type contract, the sharing formula may be expected to vary greatly,
depending on

the degree of confidence the government has in its estimate

of costs versus the degree of confidence the contractor has in its estimate.

This may make the range of costs over which the incentive provisions

operate quite extensive.30
In most large development contracts the incentive will not only
embody cost, but performance and schedule incentives as well.

pose of combining these incentives is fairly obvious .

The pur-

A satisfactory

product or service is desired at a reasonable cost and within certain
time limits.
There has been a dramatic increase in the use of incentive-type

contracts since 1961.

Between 1955 and 1961, the use of cost-plus - fixed-

fee contracts increased from 19.7 to 38 percent of the total contract
awards.

However, between 1961 and 1963, this percentage decreased t o

20 . 7 percent.

A goa l of 12.3 percent has been es t abl i shed for fiscal

year 1965, with cost-plus-fixed fee contracts to be awarded only for
exploratory and research study projects.31
A major cause of cost overruns on major development programs has

been attributed to the widesprea d use of cost - plus - fixed - fee contracts.
30rb id . , P. 12.
31Department of Defense Appropriations for 1965, Part 4 , Secretary
of Defense, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, p. 278.
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The use of these contracts resulted in a lack of detailed advance planning which is a requisite for the close pricing of contracts and the
close supervision of contractor performance.

The open- ended arrange-

ment of reimbursable-type contracts also encouraged the premature
initiation of development proj ec ts.

This provided

no incentive to

the Servic es to define precisely in terms of performance characteristics,

delivery dates, and costs what was to be procured.3 2
The use of incentives has not only resulted in more adequate

definition of the end product, but has also reduced costs considerably.
"And for each contract dollar we shift from cost plus to fixed price or
price i ncentive our evidence shows we have saved about ten cents and we

have shifted something on the order of $4 billion per year so far . .,33
A Wea pons Systems Development Pr ogram
The Secretary of Defense indicates the extent of surveillance
and control the Services maintain ove r contractors in the development

of major weapons systems in the following statement:
. . use of performance and evaluation review techniques

(PERT) which identify the thousands of important events or
dec ision points which must be monitored continuously both
by Department of Defense and its contractors during the
cour se of a major deve l opment project. In the Titan III
pr ogram, for example, biweekly r epo rt s are received from the
prime systems contractor on 2,500 key even ts indica t ing cost

and time progress.34
The following account of the Minuteman program will reveal in
3 2Ibid.
3 3Ibid ., p. 278.
34 Ibid .• p . 279 .

Statement by the Secretary of Defens e McNamara.
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great er detail the exte nt of the relationshi p s betwee n government and
industry, and the control the Services exercise over a major

~eapons

deve l opment program.
The primary agent for the governmen t in its co ntacts with indu s try
in th e Minut eman program is the Unit ed States Air For ce, throu gh the Air
Force Systems Command (AFSC) a nd the Air Force Logis tics Command (AFLC) .
Air Force regulations describe their missions res pectively as fo llows :
Th e ove ral l mission of the Air Force Systems Comma nd is t o
advance aerospace technology, adapt it into ope rat iona l aerospace systems , and acquire qu ali tativ e l y s uperior aerospace
systems and material needed to accomplish the Air Force
mission.35 Th e ove r a ll missi on of the AFLC i s to pr ovide
logis tic support and services for USAF organizations and
s ystems and materia t . 36
AFSC is r es pon s ible for the initial research and d eve l opment and
making th e weap on systems operational fo r use by th e Air Force.

AFLC is

resp ons ibl e for l ogistic su pp ort, modifications, and improv ements in th e

systems after operational capability has been achieved.

These responsi-

bilities place these two Air Force commands into a daily, intimate
r e lati onshi p with t he aerospace ind ust ry.

Th e Armed Servic es Procurement

Regu lati ons and the Air Forc e Procuremen t Instru ctio ns set up the basic

rul es for this r e latio nshi p.
The Minuteman program is managed by the Ballistic Systems Divi sion
(BSD) of th e Air Forc e Sy stems Command Techno l ogy Laboratories (STL), a
non-profit subsidiary of Thompson Ramo Wo o ldridg e Corporati on .

The

35 De partment of the Air Force Regulation 23-8, Organizatio n and
Mission--Field, Air Force Sy s t ems Command (Washington, D.C . 1962), p. 1 .
36Department of th e Air Force Regulation 23-2, Organizat ion and
Mission--Fi e ld, Air Forc e Logistics Command (Washington, D.C ., 1962),
p. 1.
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Ballistic Systems Division is the executive agent r es ponsible for accom-

plishment of all phases of the development program-design and manufacture
of the missile--all it s grou nd equ i pment, design and const ructi on of
development and opera ti onal system facilities, a nd provisi on of l og i s tics
support and trained personne l to opera te and maintain the system.

Fur-

ther, it provi des overall pr ogram planning, direction, con trol and
business management, includi ng the formal co ntracting function and

logistic support.

The Space Technology Laboratory provides systems

engineering design coordination and technical direction.37
The Boeing Corporation, one of seve ral associate contractors in
the Minuteman research and development program, is prima ril y responsible
for weapon system integra ti on and pr ov id es for design integration, physical

i nte gration of subsystems, and the testing out of the total weapon system.
Add i ti onally, Boeing is res pon sibl e for the development of the launch and
controls systems.

Eac h of t he other associate contractors is res pon sible

for th e development of the o th er major subsystems.

Boeing and the o ther

associate con t ractors have a number of first-tier subcontractors to
develop various components a nd to furnish e quipme nt, materials, a nd
services of various kinds.

Additio nal l y, the subcontractors a re su p-

port ed by second- and third-ti e r subcontractors according to the require-

ment s of th e deve lopme nt pr ogram .38
BSD, assisted by STL, retains cont rol of the program and coo rdinat es all basic technical des i gns.

This g r oup constantly evalua t es a ll

3 7u .S . House of Re pre sentatives, Subcommittee for Special Inves tigations of the Committ ee on Armed Serv ic es, Weapons System Management and
Team Sys tem Concept in Government Contracting, 86th Cong . , lst Sess .

(Washing ton, D.C . , 1959), p. 208.
3Brb id . , P. 209.
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factors affecting optimi zation of weapon systems design a nd constantly
reviews design and development programs of all the associate contractors.
Boeing, as the assembly and test contractor, is required to maintain

close continuous coordination with the BSD/STL group.

The initial plan

was developed by the Air Force complex and forwarded to the associate
contractors, to be used as a guide in working out their respective

detailed plans.

The associate contractor plans were then submitted t o

the Air Force where they were integrated into an overall master plan,
which upon release became the basic authority and directi on for implementation of the contract.

Key dates were established for use as targets

and as a basis for measuring progres s.

The plan is a management tool

for the Air Force and guidance for the contractors.

The progr ess is

monitored and compared with milestones in the master program plan . 39
Regu lar technical directive (TO) meetings, chaired by STL, are
held to frequently reviewed program status, progress, and problem areas
with all associate contractors.

The minutes from these meetings and

other STL instructions become technical directives and are processed

to become legal amendments to the prim e contract .

By means of these

meetings, progress is monitored and technical direction is provided .

Close relationships and con tinuing coordination is achieved.

The system

is designed to shorten lines of communication and facilitate prompt

decision making.

Complete control of subcontracting is retained by the

contracting agency, BSD, and all direct contract charges and overhead
expenses ar e audited by Air Force inspection personnel who are r esident
at the co ntractor's plant as standard routine procedure .4 0

3 9 Ibid.
40Ibid.
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The competition in obtaining such a contract is keen.

in which Boeing obtained this contract follows:
was held at which 22 companies were represented.

The manner

A preproposal briefing
Companies present were

in no position to know how many companies were sent the request for pro-

posal, although it was reasonable to assume that the request for propo sal
was sent to more firms than those present.

the request for proposal.

Eleven companies responded to

These companies included a substantial segment

of American industry--General Motors, Bendix Aviation, Douglas Aircraft,

General Electric, Martin, Boeing, Chrysler, Convair, McDonnell, North
American Aviation, and Northrop.4l
Aft er the written prop osa ls were submitted and evaluated, each
prime contractor was invit ed to brief the Air Force Proposal Board on

his proposal.

The Board was made up of e ight Air Force officers and two

government civilian emp l oyees .
were:

Organizations represent ed

on the Board

The Air Force Syst ems Command, the Air Force Logistics Command,

the SAC (Strategic Air Command, potential user).

After about five weeks

of study, Boeing was informed they had been awarded the assembly and test
contract.

Boeing then worked with the Air Force in developing proposed

statements of work fo r subcontractors.

It was then Boeing's task to

integrate the assoc iat e subcontractor system into a workable overa ll

system acceptable to the Air Force.42
The following statement by Major General Sam Phillips, former
director of the Minuteman program, indicates some of the relationships
es tablish ed between industry and government as well as those corporations
4 1rhid., p. 211.
4 2Ibid.
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having responsibility for the major subsystems:
Our approach now, is for the Ballistic Systems Division
(BSD) Program Office to be responsible for system management. We have contracted with STL to do our systems engineering and technical direction of our associate contractors.
The STL military project teamworks closely together here
in Inglewood to direct and coordinate the activities of
our six prime associate contractors plus certain other prime
contractors such as the architect engineer. Boeing is responsible for systems test operation, for physical integration of the system, for assembly and checkout in the field .
Autonetics has the guidance and control system, and the
ground support equipment uniquely associated with guidance
and control. Thiokol has the first stage engine, Aerojet
the second, and Hercules Powd e r the third stage. Avco has
the re-entry unique to the handling and check-vehicle,
plus such ground equipment out of the re-entry vehicle with
its warhead. Parsons Company is the architect engineer.43
There is little doubt that the development of major weapons systems
is a complex project which requires a great deal of centralized planning
and control.

It is for this reason that the government -c ontractor relation-

ship cannot be the same as the typical buyer-seller relationship.

Further,

the uncertainties involved and the high costs of development further indi cate the need for close surveillance and control.

The recent changes effected by the Department of Defense in its
concept of research and development, with the application of "project
definition" assure the continuance of close survei llan ce and control over
contractors participating in development programs.

It i s, therefore, un-

like l y that the const raint s placed on the weapons industry will be relaxed
in the foreseeable future.

43 Philip Geddes, "1-linuteman 1-!anagement, The View from the Top,"
Aerospace 1-lanagement , Hay, 1962, p . 28.
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CHAPTER III
IMPACT ON GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS
The Background
Economic changes in specific geographical areas are subject to
various forces.

Techno l ogy creates new demands--both product a nd service --

and displaces old ones.
and industry.

Specialized resources attract people, business,

Major governmental decisions, local, state, and national,

encourage or stifle economic growth.

The population increases, its in-

come grows and it improves it s skills; or perhaps there is a decline in

all these as people leave seeking be tter economic alternatives.

Initia-

tive on the part of l ocal promotional groups may attract activities that
represent net additions to the national product or mere relocations from
other l ess favored areas . 1
Small geographical areas have a common economic feature.

In

addition to the response to the broad gene ral forces of development and
fluctuation, these areas are more often than not peculiarly subject to
stimuli or s lowdown by outside forces.

Growth or decline in their

economies are likely to be a somewhat errat ic and typically unbalanced
response to global, national, regional, and state patterns of which it

is a minute and often specialized subpart.2

Economic responses such as

these have resulted from the development of modern weapons systems.
1c. P. Blair, Economic Growth Projections for the Dallas, Fort
Worth, and Houston Trading Areas (Austin: Bureau of Business Research,
The University of Texas, 1961), p. l.
2rbid.
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Effects such as those described above have been felt in individual communities and regions throughout the United States as a result of federal
contracts for defense purposes, since the development and production of
weapons is by far the largest single element of government s p endi ng .
Effects of Reduced Military Expenditures
The advanced weapons industry is also sufficiently large to have
a substantial impact on the total economy as well.
this proposition is provided by events in 1957.

An illustration of

In June 1957, a stretch-

out {reduction in the rate of activity) for many weapons projects combined
with a r educed rate of progress payments (partial payments made in advance
of delivery to defense contra ctors engaged in the execution of a weapons
project) had a significant impact on the national economy.

Thus, defense

contractors were required to finance privately a greater share of their
work in progress.

Both these actions were taken to maintain Depa rtment

of Defense expenditures at the planned figure of $38 bi ll ion and to avoid
additional government borrowing that would have necessitated an increase
in the statutory limit on the federal debt.3
These steps resulted in defense contractors reducing both their
work week and their labor force .

and spending.

In turn, thi s reduced consumer income

In addition to these direct effects, these governmental

actions created uncertainty in industry and among consumers which may

have influenced both business and consumer spending.
Wh ile these actions did not precipitate the 1957 recession, it
is generally agreed that they were contributing factors.

In an article

3see New Yo r k Times, June 2, June 23, and September 29, 1957, for
a full discussion of these actions .
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based on interviews with 165 business executives, including many whose
firms had no defense contracts,

cutbacks in defense spending.

~

criticized the stretchout and

It was noted that these measures were

placed into effect just as the economy was slowing down.

Economica lly,

this was considered bad timing as well as having an adverse impact on

the U.S . defense posture at the time the race for outer space was beginning.4

Further evidence of this was presented by Professor Samuelson

who listed among the contributing causes of the recession, "the drop
in 1957 defense spending. •6
This example substantiates the fact that the economic health of
the weapons industry has a substantial impact on the stability of the
economy of which i t is such a major part.

The loca tion of the weapons

system industry gives it a more vital role in this respect in many areas
than its total size alone would indicate.

Table 4 shows the distribu-

tion among the states for 1961 and 1962 defense procurement.
figures indicate that there is something for every state.

These

Thus, the

economic impact of fluctuations in spending for defense is diffused
throughout the country and has a direct and immediate impact upon the
economy of each locality.6

4George B. Bookman, "How Top Businessmen View th e Recession, "
April 1958, p . 256.

~'

Su.s. Joint Economic Commit tee, Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy,
Hearings , Fiscal Policy Implications of the Cu r rent Economic Outlook,
85th Cong., 2d Sess (Washington, D. C., 1948), p . 175.
6peck and Scherer, p. 106 .
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Table 4.

Defense contract awards and estimated annual payrolls, by states ,

1961 and 1962a

Contract

State

awardsb

1961
Estimated annual Contract
awardsb
eaJ!r011
Military
CivilpersonnelC iansd

Total
Alabama
Alaska
Ariz ona

Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut

Delaware
District of

Columbia

1962
Estimated annual
EaJ!r 011
Military
Civilpersonnel c iansd

24,305

6,057

5,592

27,800

6,948

5,828

105
92
245
46

86
124
77
39

210
45
44
19

154
63
153
85

97
129
79
78

215
45
45
27

5,277
466
1,018

758
117
22

839
84
15

5,993
565
l, 213

843
159
18

867
89
16

71

34

47

35

150

69

176

182

69

172

Florida
Georgia
Hawaii

493
301
27

235
256
138

140
188
128

645
337
32

246
332
153

145
201
132

Idaho
Illinois

14
437
353
127

23
184
34
5

3
162
62
5

26
531
637
179

25
194
47
6

3
179
70
3

539
46
139

138
159
77

32
71
34

394
44
244

158
200
161

34
75
45

97
528
1,072
590
189
69
338
95

67
184
146
86
20
112
102
38

11
218
158
66

80
469
1,310
678
297
100
546
31

62
219
150
94
25
130
133
38

10
231
161
65
11
34
88
7

Indiana
Iowa
Kansas

Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine

Maryland
Massachusetts

Michigan
Minnesota

Mississippi
Missouri
Montana

11

33
83
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Table 4 (continued)

State

Contract
awardsb

1961
Estimated annua 1
Ea~ro11

Contract
awardsb

CivilMilitary
personnelC iansd
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey

1962
Estimated annual
Ea:tro11
Military
CivilpersonnelC iansd

New York
North Carolina
North Dakota

51
9
105
950
64
2,643
237
13

73
38
36
144
88
151
260
35

26
17
62
164
68
303
60
4

53
8
59
1,063
61
2,669
269
100

81
36
40
181
94
165
324
43

26
17
62
161
69
314
62
7

Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island

1,004
123
28
804
25

83
119
20
55
22

218
143
22
399
50

1,063
136
46
952
58

88
142
21
57
30

232
154
21
417
50

South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas

41
28
144
1,138

162
21
68
706

86
10
39
340

65
113
184
1,006

1.80
23
73
779

90

Utah
Vermont
Virginia

350
16
505

15
2
322

104
1
466

299
16
446

17
2
348

477

Washing t on
West Virginia

646
19
222
24

190
2
18
15

139
5

921
134
259
23

251
2
18
17

140
5
13
4

2,192

82

2,762

67

New Mexico

Wi sconsin

Wyoming
Undistributed

arn millions of dollars.

11

4

For years ending June 30.

11

40
362
116

Data for contracts

r efer to awards made in fiscal year specified ; expenditures relating to
those awards may extend over severa l years .

bAwards of $10,000 or more for supplies, services, and construction. Figures
reflect prime-contract awards and therefore do not show the effec t of subcontracting on state distribution of defense work.
CFor shore- based personnel only.
dDirect hire on l y .
Source : Department of Defense, Office of the Secre t ary. Reproduced f r om
~ureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1963
(Washington, D.C., 1963), p. 260.
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Geographic Concentration of Spending
for Weapons Systems
However, the geographic concentration of weapons spending is of
greater importance than its dispersion--in terms of direct economic consequences.

In fiscal year 1962, defense companies in 10 states received

65.7 percent of the prime contract awards, while firms in California
alone received almost 24 percent.7

Further, California firms are primar-

ily concentrated in the Los Angeles-San Diego area, consisting of these
two counties plus Imperial, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, Santa
Barbara, and Ventura.

The three defense industries (aircraft, electronics,

and ordnance) account for 39 percent of the manufacturing employment in
the Los Angeles area. 8

Add to this the businesses in other industries

supporting the defense industry along with the proportion of goods and
services purchased by defense employees and the effect is what is known
as "California ' s Precarious One-Crop Economy."9

An estimate of direct defense employment in manufacturing in southern California indicated a total of 360,000.

If these figures are comparable

to total U.S. employment in missiles and aircraft of 977,900 in October 1959,
as calculated by the U.S. Department of Labor, then southern California had
at that time approxima t ely one-third of all worke rs in the industry. 10
7u.S. Congress, Subcommittee on Defense Procurement of the Joint
Economic Committee, Background Material on Economic Aspects of Military
Pr ocu r ement and Supply, 88th Cong., lst Sess. (Washington, D.C., 1963), p.8.

~aurice J. Gershenson, "Shifts in California's Industrial and Employment Composition," Monthly Labor Review, May 1959, p. 513.
9seyom Brown, "Southern California's Precarious One-Crop Economy,"
The Reporter , January 7, 1960 , p. 25.
lOGeorge A. Steiner, National Defense and Sou thern California (Los
Angeles: Southern California Associates of the Committee for Economic
Development, 1961), p. 84.
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The consequences of such a concentration can have major economic
impact on an area or community.

The downward trend in several major

weapons programs in 1961 and 196 2 has created unemployment problems for
many employees, plants, and communities.

Examples of thes e are the B-52,

B-58, BOMARC , HOUND DOG, SKYBOLT, ATLAS, BMEWS, and other programs.ll
On the other hand, southern California has also experienced problems with the explosive growth of defense installations.

Lompoc grew in

three years from a community of approximately 5,250 to almost 15,000
because of the establishment o.f Vandenberg Air Force Base and the Point
Arguello Naval Missile Facility . l2
The city of San Diego is a prime example of what may happen to
an area with a heavy concentration of defense spending, when many of

these contracts are withdrawn.

In 19 61, aircraft missile employment

and goverrunent wages made up 44 percent of the San Diego civilian payroll . 13
During World War II, San Diego became one of the nation ' s largest aircraft
producers, as well as being the site of the San Diego Naval Base.

Its

population rose from 289,348 to 556,808 in 1950 and by 1960 it had soared
to 1,033,011.

It was considered the fastest-growing major city in the

United Stat es .

As the years went by, the aircraft industry edged into

the missile industry, but stayed mainly with airc raft production.

In

1950, the industry grossed $104,500,000; by 1960 the yearly figure was
11 u.s. Congress, Subcommittee on Defense Procurement of the Joint
Economic Committee, Hearings, Impact of Military Supply and Service Activities on the Economy, 88th Gong ., lst Sess. (Washington, D.C., 1963), p. 60.
l 2steiner, p . 107.
lJ"How San Diego Got Trapped," Business Week, December 8, 1962,
p. 127
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over $1 billion.

Then the Air Force stopped buying Convair's F-102 and

F-106 airplanes.

In 1961, San Diego's industry took in a bare $215

million on plane s and missiles.l4
As a result of th e shift from aircraft to missiles, employment
dropped steadily and San Diego's unemployment grew to 8.8 percent and
was likely to grow higher, for Convair's liquid-fueled Atlas was gradually
being phased out in favor of the solid-fueled Minuteman. 15
Concentration of Research and Develo pment
Fifty-eight percent of all monies spent on missiles and 25 percent
of all expenditures for electronics in fiscal year 1961 were for research,
development, test, and evaluation work.

There has been a strong tendency

toward concentration of such contracts in California and in the coastal
strip from Boston, Massachusets, to Washington, D. C.

Also benefiting

have been certain Mountain and Southern states . 16
Department of Defense contracts awarded for research and development in fiscal year 1962 totalled over $6 billion, which was almost onefourth of all prime contract awards during that year.

Further, the awards

for the procurement of research and development is in a strongly rising
trend . 17
14 "Bust Town7" Newsweek, August 17, 1962, p. 20.
I5rbid.
16u.s. Senate Select Committee on Small Business, Impact of Defense
Spending on Labor Surplus Areas--1962, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Washi ngton,
D.C., 1962), p . 171.
17u.s. Congress, Subcommittee on Def ense Procurement of the Joint
Economic Committee, Background Material on Economic As pects of Military
Procu r ement and Sup pl y, 88th Cong . , 1st Sess. , (Wa shing t on, D.C., 1962),
p. 41.
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These contracts are more closely concentrated in a few states

than the remaining three-fourths of defense procurement.

In fiscal

year 1962, these were the 12 leading states performing 88.5 percent
of all the research, development test, and evaluation work. 18

Percent

California
New York
Washington
Massachusetts
New Jersey
Pennsylvania

39.2
10.87
8.06
5.92
4.80
3 . 86

Colorado
Florida
Maryland
Ohio
Utah
Connecticut

Percent
3.75
3.78
3.12
2.17
1.95
1 .06

The remaining 11.5 percent of the total research effort was contracted with business and non-profit firms in the remaining 38 states .
It is noteworthy that California and the Eastern Seaboard states, between
them performed almost three-fourths of all military research and development during fiscal year 1962.

This is highly significant, because a firm

which has conducted or managed the research, design, development, and
test work on a new weapon system or a major component thereof, and has

assembled the engineering talent and experience for this purpose, obviously
has a great advantage in competing for the follow-on production contracts
and for new developmental contracts as well .

It is logical, then, that

production contracts for newly developed items, figuri ng heavily i n fut ur e
federal procurement, have a tendency to be placed where the research,
development, test, and evaluation effort has been centered.

awards:

'~any

About these

people believe them to be the seed corn variety, which later

leads to even larger production contracts. 112 0
18u.s. Senate, Select Committee on Small Business, Thirteenth Annual
Repo rt, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, D.C., 1963), p. 40.
19Thirteenth Annual Report, p. 71.
20sackground Material on Economic Aspects of Military Procurement
and Supply, p. 40.
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The Procurement Mix of the Weapons Industry
There is no one clearly identifiable product which is produced by
the weapons industry.

These products are partly defined by their use,

which may be for the potential destruction of an enemy or for defense
of the country against destruction by such an enemy and also partly by
their advanced technical characteristics.

The relative importance of

various types of weapons meeting these requirements has changed radically
in the past 20 years . 21
Missiles have increased greatly in importance- -sp ending for
missiles has risen from 0.5 percent in 1953 to about 33.6 percent of
al l hard goods purchased for defense in 1961. 22
Expenditures for aircraft have remained relatively constant
between 1953 and 1961 .

Aircraft spending was at 31.5 percent of fiscal

year 1953 deliveries, and at 28.2 percent of the total fiscal year 1961
procurement. 23
It is in spending for ships and ordnance where there has been a
great decline.

Expenditures for ships were 26.2 percent of the hardware

bill during World War II, and dropped to 6.8 percent in fiscal year 1953
and was 7.8 percent in fiscal year 1961.24
Ordnance (items such as tanks, othe r vehicles, weapons and ammunition) plus production, construction, and other commercial types of

21Peck and Scherer, p. 107.
2 2u.s. Senate, Subcommittee on Retailing, Distribution, and Marketing Practi ces, Report to the Select Committ ee on Small Business, Impact of
Defen se Spend ing on Labor-Surplus Areas, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. {Washington,
D.C., 1963), p. 5.
23Ibid. , p. 169.
24Ibid.
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equipment and hardware constituted about 50 percent of the military
hard goods bought

in fiscal year 1953.

By fiscal year 1961, these

were only 12.4 percent of the total prime contract awards.

In eight

years, they had fallen from one-half to one-eighth of the total hard
goods buy. 25
Significantly, expenditures for electronics in current weapons

systems has increased tremendously--both in aircraft and in missiles.
Authoritati ve estimates indicate that for fiscal year 1964, the electronics bill will be 30 percent of the research and development budget,
25 percent of the aircraft budget, and 35 percent of the missile budget
and $1.5 billion for "pure" electronics not assoc iat ed with aircraft

and missiles.
year 1964. 26

These expenditures will approximate $6.6 billion in fiscal
Coupled with space expenditures of $2.3 billion for elec-

tronics (about $800 million for military purposes) the total is about $9
billion for electronics.27
The increase in expenditures for missiles and electronics and the

decline in

the spending for ordnance, ships, and to a limited extent for

aircraft, has had a major impact on a large section of the economy.

These

changes in defense procurement have also caused some major geographic
consequ ences .

Geographic Shifts of Weapons Procurement
The changes in the weapons systems product mix has caused maj or
changes in

the location of those industries providing weapons and weapons

25Ibid.
26 ''Military Electronics Will Level Off In Fiscal 1964," Electronics,
January 25, 1964, p . 18.
27 Ibid.
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products t o the government .

The greatest geograph i cal adjustments may

be found in the heavy losses of the East North Central and Middle Atlantic
areas and in the large gains of the West Coast and Mountain states.

The

Mountain and Pacific states which had 13.5 percent of prime World War II
con tract awards, increased this sha r e to 18.6 percent during the Kor ean
conflict and to 32.6 percent in fiscal year 1961.

The large

incre~se

in

electronics and missile procurement are definitely related to these

statistics. 28
On the oppo site side of the coin, we find that the s t ates of
Illinois, Ohio, Indiana, and Wisconsin, combined, we r e awarded 21.9 per-

cent of the total defense contracts in Worl d War II, 17 . 8 pe r cent during
the Korean conflict, and onl y 9.1 percent in fiscal yea r 1961 .

The East

No rth Central a r ea defense contract awards d r opped from $8.7 billi on
during Korea to $2.6 billion in 1961.

The loss of $6.1 billion pe r year

in defense contracts can have severe economic impact and can mean hundreds
of th ousands of j ob s .

It is no surprise, th en, that many communities in

these states have encounte red recur r ent unemployment pr oblems.

During

the World War II and Korean conflicts, these sta t es contributed heavily
to the produ ction of wheeled vehicles, weapons, ammunition, and equip-

ment items which made up a large portion of the defens e procurement bill,
but which now form a relatively smaller share of defens e requirements. 29
The Middle Atlantic states , New York, Pennsylva ni a , and New Jersey
had a smaller share of defense awards in 1961 than during Korea, but the
28 rmpact of Defense Spending on Labor Surplus Areas--1962, p .
169.
29 I bi d. , p. 171.
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losses were relatively less serious than for the Midwest.

The gains

in electronics and missiles for the plants of these states, balanced
out against losses in the more traditional fields of procurement, par-

ticularly in the western section of New York.30
The rapid rise in

expenditures for missiles and electronics is

also related to the higher share in fiscal year 1961 awards, compared
with the Korean period to firms in Massachusetts, Texas, and Florida,

as well as the plants in California and Colorado 3l
The changing geography of American industry has had significant
impact on the employment-unemployment picture in the United States.
Since 1947, eight states had an employment growth which was double
the national average.

These were Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida,

Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Utah.

And one of the most dramatic indi -

cations of this changing geography is that one out of every six jobs in
the United States is located in just three states - -California, Florida,
and Texas.

However, large industrial states like Wisconsin, Michigan,

Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio increased their employment by less than the
national average.32
Preparation for Reduced or Shifting
Defense Spending
The relaxed tensions since the Cuban crisis, along with the nuclear

test ban have brought hopes that peace and disarmament were possible to
achieve over an extended period.
30 rbid.
31
I bid .
3 2I bid., p. 26.

In recognition of the possible economic

50
consequ ences, the Pre si dent orde r ed the formation of a high-leve l gove r nment c ommittee to help him cope wi t h the impact of possible a r ms r eductions
and shifts

in defense spending.

The President fea r ed that military spend -

ing cha nges could weake n th e economy .

The impact of a large reduction

from the $ 1 billion a week expenditur es for defense , whic h was about
half of the entire $98 billion budget for fiscal yea r 1964, could be
highly significant.33

The Pr esident s t ated in a memorandum:

Federal ou tlays for defense a r e of such magnitude
tha t the y inevitably have major economic significance.

In

ce rtai n regions of the nati on and in certain c ommunities,

th ey provide a significant share of t o t a l employment income.
lt is th e ref or e important that we improve our knowledge of the
economic impacts of such spending, so appropriate action can
be taken in coope ra t ion wi th state and local governments ,
private industry, and lab o r t o minimize po tenti a l disturbances

which may arise from cha nge s in the leve l and patte r ns of
defense outlays .34
The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense fo r Arms Control expected
visible progress coward a n Eas t-W est Arms Control agreement i n th e ensu ing
year, and he urged defense contractors t o seek new markets as insurance

against reduced military expenditures.

He indicated that the demand for

equipment for arms cont r ol inspection could not be expected to make up
f o r the amount of defense procurement reductions if an a rms agreement

was reached.JS
Th e r e is a difference of opin i on on how well th e ec onomy would
bear up under a major r ed ucti on in arms outla ys.

Some leading government

officials are on record as saying an adjustment could be relativel y smooth
33 New York Times, December 22, 1963, p . 1.
34 rbid.
35New York Times, December 27, 1963, p . 3 .
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with proper planning. 36

The Deputy Secretary of Defense stated:

There is no reason that the economic impact of defense

programs, whether stemming from major budget shifts either
up or down, or from the shifting pattern of procurement
within a relatively limited budget--cannot be accommodated
without serious disruption or distortion of our overall
economic position.37
He stated fur ther that he hoped for a decline in defense spending,
but that even if there was an increase in military spending, "there would

still be continual changes

in the pattern of procurement

there

would still be shif t s in installations and base closings, there would
still be program cancellations and completions . .

.. 38

These changes

would have consequences for the geographical areas in which they occurred.
Some private groups are less optimistic about the ability of the
economy to withstand the impact of a severe drop in arms expenditures
without causing grave trouble.

The Stanford Research Institute would

expect a monumental problem if there should occur any large shift in
either the amount or the pattern of defense spending.39
Some contractors are particularly vulnerable to reductions since

they rely almos t comple tel y on government business.

Examples of such

companies are Republic Aviation, McDonnell, Grumman, Lockheed, Avco,
and North American .

By contrast, other top defense contractors are

broadly diversified and could withstand the impac t of a big cut in
the defense budget without too much strain.

Companies such as General

36 "Sh ifts in Defens e Business," Financial World, January 1964, p. 3.
3 7Katherine Johns en, "Effort Urged to Ease Effect of DOD Shifts,"
Aviati on Week and Space Technology, November 11, 1963, p. 31.
38lbid.
39"Shifts in Defense Business," p. 3.
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General Electric, whose $1 billion worth of business with the government
accounts for only 20 percent of its total yearly volume and American
Telephone and Telegraph whose one -half billion dollars worth of government business accounts for only 3 percent of its yearly volume, would
have no great difficulties.

However, the average defense contractor

does not enjoy such diverisification, and a large reducti on in defense
business could have serious economic consequenc es

on

such a firm and

the community in which it is located.40
A Senate Subcommittee on manpower and employment as well as an
inter-agency group under the President's Council of Economic Advis ors
began to study the effect of the military program on t he over-all
economic growth, and the adaptability of the defense industry to shifts
in military requirements or disarmament.

These groups considered the

cutbacks resulting from changing military requirements or from possible
disarmament as the same basic pr ob lem.

Cutbacks hitting hard at one

defense firm and one con:nnunity are being called "little disarmaments.
11

11

To the people involved, these are the same as disarmament.••4l

These committees were to establish the organizational machinery
and policies t o meet the disrupti ons of these "l ittle disarmaments.

11

By so doing, there wou ld be preparation to adjust smoothly to changes
that might be required by any general disarmament step. 42
The size of the weapons industry, its widespread dispersi on

40 Ibid.
4 1Katherine J ohnsen, "Economic Impact of Defense Shifts Eyed, "
Av iati.on Week and Space Technology, September 30, 1963, p. 28. Statement
by Archib ald S. Alexander, Chief of the Economic Bureau of the Arms Control
and Disarmament Ag ency.
42 Ib id.
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throughout the states, along with its heavy concentration in specific
areas and its crucial importance to these areas, means that changes to
the weapons acquisition process have widespread economic consequences .

As a result, there will also be some political pressures upon weapons
development and production decisions, for there is too much at s t ake
in the purchase of modern weapons to allow this to be a private affair
between the services and their contractors.43
Political Implications of Defense Spending
The distribution and award of government contracts are of great
concern to those who are elected to look after the interests of the
states, districts, municipalities, etc.

Since the development and pro-

duction of weapons is by far the largest single element of government
spending, political variables are obviously reflected in the weapons
acquisition equation . Political pressures are apt to arise in connection

with the selection of firms to conduct new weapons programs and with the
cancellation of going programs.44
These pressures are also related to the geographic shifts of
weapons procurement previously discussed.

Senator Javits of New York

introduced a bill in 1959 that required procuring agencies to consider
"the strategic and economic desirability of allocating purchases to
different geographic areas of the Nation."45

This action was viewed by

the West Coast as an attempt by Easterners to reverse the rising trend
of West Coast domination of the weapons systems business.

In order to

43Peck and Scherer, p. 107.
44Ibid., p.96 .
45 u.s. Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services,
Nilitary Procurement, 86th Cong., lst Sess. (Washington, D.C., 1959),
pp. 22 - 24 . From Section 2, C, lll of the Bill.
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present opposition to this bill, the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce
organized an emergency industrial task force o f prominent businessmen

and "the task force called Professor Gerhard Rostvold of Pomona College,
to prepare the California case against the conspiracy of the Easterners
to 'raid' the Pacific Coast's defense cluster. '~6
In the East, feelings also ran strong. Senator Javits stated:
To many of us in the East, the so-called missile gap
has been translat ed into the defense order gap. Many New
Yorkers apply this term to the steady loss of defense contracts in ou r State, while there has been a steady increase
in prime defense missile contracts placed in other parts of
the country, particularly with firms on the West Coast.47
This sectional rivalry has continued through the years.
In a press release , Governor Edmund G. Brown of California said
that his state gets a large share of nati onal defense contracts because
it earns them, not because the federal government is partial to the state.
In a telegram to Senator Javits, the Governor obje cts to Javits ' criticism of the Defense Department ' s contract award policy and his inference
of favoritism to California.

He told the New York Republican that Calif-

ornia gets 24.6 percent of defense contracts because it is able to provide
the research facili ti es and scientists to do 41.3 percent of all defense
research and development being done in the country.48
Following is the text of the Governor ' s telegram :
I must ob ject t o the error and injustice of your charges
agains t the national administration's policies for the awarding
of defense contracts and the inference you draw of favoritism
46 Brown, p. 28.
47 u.s. Congress, Subcommittee on Defense Pr ocurement of the Joint
Economic Committee, Hearings, Impact of Defense Pr ocuremen t , 86th Gong . ,
2nd Sess . (Washington, D. C. , 196D), p . 24.
48Press Release 561, Office of the Governor of California, Jul y 26,
196 2.
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toward California. According to a recent Defense Department study of contract awards with which you should be
familiar, California has earned her 24.6 per cent share of
all defense contract awards by providing the research
facilities and skilled scientists who do 41.6 per cent of
this country's research in the defense fields, especially
in the rapidly expanding aerospace industry. The people
of California have invested heavily to develop and support
the finest system of higher education in the country. This
provides the defense industries many of the facilities they
must have for research and, more important, the trained

scientists and technicians they require.

I am sympathetic

with your concern for New York's serious unemployment problems and I know the administration is, too. However, it

is not need for defense contracts but the ability to fulfill
them which must dictate the Defense Department's contract
award policy. I respectfully suggest that New York would be
in a better position to compete with California in the defense
field if it were to give the attention to public higher education which increasingly has been given top priority in
our state.49
Despite these rivalries and accusations, it appears that politics
have little bearing in the award of weapons systems contracts.
Yet, from our own case studies, we would say that

at least the direct effect of politics in weapon acquisition
processes tends to be exaggerated. We discovered only a few
decisions in which a possible direct political influence may
have played a role, and even here the political factor . was so
intermixed with other issues that it is difficult to discern

its importance in shaping the outcome.50
Concentration of Military Contracts

Military contracts, in addition to being co ncentrated in specific

geographic areas, are also concentrated in the hands of a relatively small
number of large companies .

Table 5 shows that the first 100 companies, in

terms of contract volume, during the fiscal years 1958 through 1962,
received from 74 . 2 percent to 72.3 percent of the United States total
~Th~.

50Peck and Scherer, p. 114.
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Percent of defense contract awards to first 100 companies

Table 5.

s. total

Percent of U.

Fiscal

ear

Companies

1958

1959

1960

1961

1962

ls t
2nd
3rd
4th
5th

9.8
6.4
3.6
3.5
3.0

7.2
5 .2
4 .5
4.1
4.0

26 . 3

25.0

6 .5
5. 2
5.2
4.1
3.8
24.8

5.6
4.7
4 .4
4 .0
3.8

l to

6.0
5.1
4.8
4 .6
4.3
24 . 8

22 . 5

6 to 10
l l to 25

12.4
19.1

12 . 0
17.6

11.3
17.4

ll.8
18.2

ll.l
17.2

to 25

57 . 8

54.6

53.5

54 . 8

50.8

9.1
4.8
2.5

10.7
5.5
3 .0
73.8

ll.3
5 .4
3.2
73 . 4

ll.O
5 .5
2.9
74.2

12.6
6.0
2.9
72.3

26 to 50
51 to 75
76 to 100
t o 100
Source:

--

74/~

u.s . Department of Defense, 100 Com£anies and their Subsidiary

Coq~orations

~, n .d.

Lis ted Accord ins to Net Values of Military Prime Contract
(mime ogra phed)

dollars of military contracts of $10,000 or more.

Noteworthy is the

fact that the first five companies in this group received 26.3 percent

to 22 . 5 percent of the total, while the first 25 companies received
from 57.8 percent to 50.8 percent of the total.
a tremendous concentration of economic power.

These statistics reveal
The magnitude of this

power can readily be seen from the totals of fiscal years 1961 and 1962.
In fiscal year 1962, the 72 . 3 percent volume of military expenditures
with the first 100 companies represented approximately $ 18.5 billion

57
out of a total of $25.5 billion, and in 1961 the 74.2 percent represented
about $16.8 billion out of a total of $22.7 billion.Sl
Congress has shown concern over this concentration of dollar out-

lays for military contracts.

Some steps to encourage more widespread

distribution of military outlays have been taken so that increased par ticipation by small business in government defense contracts may be
achieved.

The next chapter will be devoted to a discussion of the role

of small business in weapons systems procurement.

5 1Background Material on Economic Aspects of Military Procurement
and Supply , pp. 13, 18.
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CHAPTER IV
SMALL BUSINESS AND DEFENSE PROCUREMENT
Definition of Small Business
What makes a business "small"- - and thus eligible for special treatment- - depends on administrative judgment using criteria such as number

of employees, sales volume, and type of activity.

The dividing line

between "medium" and "small" has been fuzzy .

Small business has been generally defined for purposes of government procurement as a concern employing no more than 500 persons .

Recent

changes have modified this definition so that the number of employees
may be as high as a thousand i n certain businesses and industries,
depending on their nature .

Further, some industries are now classified

as either little or big business, based on annual dollar sales.

As an

example, in the construction industry, the average annual sales of the

concern and its affiliates must not exceed $7.5 million a concern. 1

The

following general definition is quoted:
A small-business concern shall be deemed to be one which is
independently owned and operated and which is not dominant
in its field of operation. In addition to the foregoing
criteria, the Administrator, in making a deta il ed definition,
may use these criteria among others: Number of employees

and dollar volume of business. Where the number of employees
is used as one of the criteria in making such definition for
any of the purposes of this Act, the maximum number of employees which a small-business concern may have under the
definition shall vary from industry to industry to the extent

lArmed Service Procurement Regulation 1-701.4 (Washington, D.C.,
1964), p. 142.
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necessary to reflect differing characteristics of such
industries and to take proper account of other relevant

factors. 2
Interest in Small Business

The Small Business Act of 1953 (Public Law 163, 83rd Congress,
lst Session) created the Small Business Administration. The following
policy of the Congress with regard to small business is found within
section 202 of that act:
It is the declared policy of the Congress that the Government should aid, assist, and protect insofar as possible
the interests of small business concerns in order to preserve free competitive enterprise, to insure that a fair

proportion of the total purchases and contracts for supplies
and services for the government be placed with small business
enterprises, and to maintain and strengthen the over-all

economy of the nation.3
The purchasing power of the federal government in regard to small
business is being used as an implementing instrument of economic policy.
Inasmuch as there has been concern over the placement of a

11

fair share 11

of military procurement with small business, the government has adopted

a deliberate policy of providing a greater share of such procurement to
foster the welfare of the small business community.
The interest in promoting the welfare of small business has long
been the policy of Congress.

However, in the past several years much

emphasis has been placed on this area by the Executive Branch.

President

Kennedy made the following statement during his press conference on
March 15, 1961:
2u .s . Senate, Select Committee on Small Business, Small Business
!£!,88th Cong., lst Sess. (Washington, D.C., 1963), p. l.
3u.s. Senate, Select Committee on Small Business , Re port of Small
Business Participation in Gover nment Pr ocurement, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.

(Washington, D.C., 1957), p. l.
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First, the Secretaries of the military departments have been
instructed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense to t ake steps
to provide a greater percentage of defense contracts for
small business. Specifically the military departments have
been asked to set a goal increasing individually in fiscal
year 1962, small business participation by ten percent over
the year for fiscal 1960. Contracts fo r small business in
fiscal yea r 1960 amou nt ed to $3,444 million or 16 percent.
We are going to try to increse that by at least 10 percent.
In addition we are going to provide an increase for small
business participation in research and development contracts.

During that year this category of contracting accounted for
$180 million, or 3.4 percent of the total. In addition,
we are asking the Department of Defense to examine how
additional contracts can be steered into distressed areas.

At the present time we are not doing as much of that as I
hope we can in the future.4
As a result of this interest by the Chief Executive and the goal
he established, the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, along
with the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force maintained a
continuous followup on this matter during the following year and issued
numerous memorandums to the military departments stressing the importance
of increasing the volume of contract awards to sma ll business conce rns

Further, the Department of Defense established a program called
"Operation Booster" in fiscal year 1962, under which every principal
procurement organization was assigned an improvement qu ota against which

their performance was measured monthly.5
The results were that for the fi rst time in f iv e yea rs a downward
trend in the percentage of awards to small business was reversed as indi-

cated in Table 6.

The percentage of prime contrac t awards6 increased

4 New York Times, March 16, 1961, p. 20.

Su.s. Senate, Select Committee on Small Bus iness, The Role of
Small Business in Government Pr ocurement --1962-1963, 87th Gong., 2nd
Sess., 1962 (Washington, D.C. , 1962), p . 5.
6A prime con tract award is a direct contract award from the Department of Defense fo r specified goods or services to a business concern. The
recipient of the award is a prime contractor.
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Awa rd s by t ype of cont rac t or by fiscal year ( amounts in millions )
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from 16.1 percent in fiscal year 1960 and 15.9 percent in fiscal year
1961 to 17.7 percent in fiscal year 1962.

More remarkable, however,

was the increase in the dollar volume to small business.

There was

an increase from $3.4 billion in fiscal year 1960 to $4.6 billion in
fisca l year 1962.

Th i s was a 35 percent increase.

However, the decrease

of prime contract awards from $4.6 billion or 17.7 percent of the total
contract awards in fiscal year 1962 to $4.3 billion or 15.8 percent in
fiscal year 1963 resulted in much Congressional criticism .
However, these statistics reveal only one source of defense
dollars to small business conce rn s.

To ascer tain the full share of

the dollars received by small business, it will be necessary to examine

the situation related to the amount of subcontracting7 dollars going to
small business from other prime con tract ors a l ong with the amounts they
receive on prime contract awards .

A "Fair Share" for Small Business

In 19 61 the Select Committee on Small Business of the United
States Senate stated in its opening paragraph to Chapter II, "Government
Pr ocurement'' of their "Annual Report":

With few changes, save for figures in dollars and percentages,
the introduction to this chapter could easily be a dup l icate
of the chapter on procurement in last year ' s annual report.
Last year at this time, your committee expressed concern over

the downward spiral of defense contracts being awarded to
smaller firms, and commended the Air Forc e for its small
but significant increase. Statistics for fiscal year 1960
recorded the same dirge. For the sixth straigh t year, the
percentage of defense awards going to smal l firms showed
7A subcontract is a contract awarded by a prime contractor to
another concern.
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a decline, from 25.3 percent in 1954 to 16.1 percent the
past yea r. B
The Committ ee i n the same report, goes on further t o state:

Nowhere is it more pointedly driven home that small
business is not receiving a fair sha re than when one

co nsid ers that just three major prime contractors r eceived a grea ter percentage of de fense contract doll a r s
than did all the thousands of small business f irms in
the United States combi ned. Your committee ca nnot visualize the necess it y for such intense centra lizati on of our

nation's defense effo rt, even allowing fo r al l the technological factors modern weaponry has introduced int o the
procurement machinery.9
Further co ncern is evidenced by the fo ll owing:
The joint failu r e of the Departme nt of Defen se and the
Small Business Administration to halt the decline and
correspondingly, t o increase the share of small business
in the awarding of military prime contracts has brought
about a situation whi ch should no longer be tolerated. 10
Research in this area revea ls numerous references to a "fair

share" of defense dollars for small business, but a clear concis e
definiti on of wh a t cons titut es a "fair " perce ntage of the total dollar
outlay for defense purp oses cannot be found.

Mr. Mau ric e L. Johnson

stat ed that, "I have ye t to see a declaration by any ag ency, o r Congressional

Committee

that s pec ifically states the meaning of a 'fa i r s hare' . " 11

The gove rnment has been remarkably silent on defi ning the "fair share. "
However, the Department of Defense has es tablished a target for the amount
of dollar ou tla ys t o small business.
Bu.s. Senat e Sel ec t Committee on Small Business, Eleventh Annual
Report, 87th Gong., l st Sess. (Washington, D.C., 1961), p. 19.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid . , p. 5.
11 Int erview with Maurice L. Johnson, Executive for Small Business,
Dir e ctorate of Procurement and Product ion, Headquarters, Air Force Logistics Command, United States Air Force, May 25, 1964.
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The Department of Def ense established new goals in early 1963,
and these were to rais e the value of prime and subcontract awards to

smal l business in the fol lowing three years so that by the end of fiscal
year 1965, small business will receive more than $10 billion in defense
awards, or approximately 33 percent of the defense procurement budget.
The fiscal year 1963 goal was to increase prime contract awards from
$200 to $300 million over fiscal year 1962 and subcontract awards by
$300 million.

The 1964 and 1965 fiscal year goals are to add $300

million each year to both the total value of prime contract and subcontract awards to small business.l 2 Whether these goals are attained
remains to be seen , and once attained, whether they will be considered
sa tisfactory by Congress is also problematical.
The Small Business Share of the Defense Dollar
In fiscal year 1963, small business firms obtained a total of
$8.8 billion in defense contracts which consisted of $4 . 6 billion in
prime contract awa rds and $4.2 billion in subcontract payments from
large defense subcontractors.

This total was the equivalent of 31.6

percent of all prime contract awards to business firms in the Uni t ed
States. 13
As reflected in Table 6 the Army and the Defense Supply Agenc y
award a greater percentage of their total procurement dollars to small
business than do either the Navy or the Air Force.

The Air Force

12u . s. Department of Defense, Small Business Report, Small Business
Objectives for Fiscal Year 1963 and Subsequent years (Washington, D.C.,
1963), p. 8.
l3u.s. Senate, Conference Relating to Small Business Participation
in Government Procurement--1963, 88th Cong., lst Sess. (Washington, D.C.,
1964)' p. 2.
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traditi onally has awarded a l ower percentage of their procurement
dollars to small business concerns because their purchases are dom-

inated by aircraft and missiles in which small business plays a minor
role.

On tl ·' other hand, small business has done relatively well with

the Army because of their requirements for a larger proportion of subsistence, textiles, and automotive items in which small companies play

a major role.

This is also reflected by types

of items in Table

which show small business procurement by major programs.
As shown in Table 7, in fiscal year 1963, small business received
51.3 percent of all contract awards for subsistence items and 62.5 percent of all awards for textiles, clothing, and equipage.

The recently

activated Defens e Supply Agency which procures much of the combined
requirements of items such as electronics supplies, subsistence, clothing, etc., for the Army, Navy, and the Air Force is in a better position
to award a high percentage of their total contract dollars to small companies, because most of their purchases are items in which small business
has a major stake.

For the fiscal years of 1962 and 1963, the Defense

Supply Agency awards to small business concerns were 46.2 percent and
40.5 percent of all prime contract dollars, respectively, as against
9.6 percent and 8.7 percent, respectively, by the Air Force (Table 3).
The long term trend in military procurement, including the small
business percentage, is shown in Table 6 and Figure l.

After the close

of hostilities in Korea, there was a sharp cutback in military procurement of heavy equipment (fiscal year 1954), and a correspondingly sharp
increase in che percentage going to small business firms.

The inter-

national situation and the increasing emphasis on modern expensive

Table 7 .

Awards by procurement program, by f is c al year ( ne t valu e $000 )
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weapons brought about a steady increase in the total value of military
procurement in each subsequent fiscal year, except for fiscal year

1960, when there was a moderate decline .

The small business dollars

increased to $3.7 billion by fiscal year 1957, and r emained approxima t ely
at that l evel through fiscal year 1961 .

During fisca l year 196 2, result-

ing from the emphasis pla ced on increasing the smal l share of the defense
dollar by the execu tive branch, small business firms received $4.6 billion
in military prime contracts, the highest since the peak Korean War year
of 1962.

There was a decline to $4.3 billion in fiscal year 1963.14

As shown in Table 8, for the seven fiscal years from 1957 through
1963, small firms averaged $3,653,000,000 per year in reported subcontract
receipts and $3,902 ,000,000 in direct prime contracts, a total of
$7,555,000,000 in defense business per year.

In this same period,

averag e annual military prime contract awards t o all business firms were

$23,041,000,000.15
Not all military prime contractors and subcontractors took part
in the Department of Defense subcontracting program which requires the
reporting of subcontract payments and therefore the reported volume of
subcontract payments to small business firms may be und erstated .

Up to

January 1960, th e Defense Small Business Subcontracting Program was on
a voluntary basis .

On J anuary l, 1960, the program became mandatory

for all prime contractors, and also on all subcontractors, who obtained
contracts of $1 million or more with substantial subcontracting possibilities.
14u.s. Department of Defense, Military Prime Contract Awards and
Subcontract Payments, July 1963 --March 1964 (Wa s hington, D.C ., 1964),
p . 7.

Table 8.

De fense small busines s subcontracting pr og ram , by fiscal year (dollar amounts in
millions)

1957
l.

Number of Large Contractors Repor ting
Their Subcontr act Receipts an d Payments
to Depart.ment o f Defense

2.

t-1 i litary Subcon tract Payments by
Reportin g Contractors, Total

a . To Smal l Business c,ncerns
b.

To Other Bus iness Concerns

3·

Percent of Total Paid to Small Business
C:mcerns (Line 2a ~ Line 2)

4.

Military Contract Re ceipts by Repo r ting
Contractors from Prime and Subcontrac t
Work

5.

Percent of Recei pts
Business Concerns

Paid Out to All
(Line 2 ~ Line 4)

1958

1959

l96o

1961

1962

l9f3

298

294

298

298

309

378

453

$9,314

$9, 026

$9 ,144

$9,666

$9,407

$10 , 56o

$ll,4ll

3 , 562
5, 752

3,242
5, 784

3,336
5,8o8

3,587
6,079

3,495
5,912

4,011
6,549

4,341
7,070

38.2~

35.~

36 .5~

37 . 1~

37 . 2~

38 .~

38.~

$16,992

$17,479

$18,704

$19,095

$19 ,8o3

$22,337

$23,667

54 .fl1,

51.~

48.~

50 . ~

47 · 5~

47.3~

48.~

Source: U.S . Department of Defense, Military Prime Contract Awards and Subcontract Payments,
July 1963- March 1964 (Washington, D.C., 1964), p. 49.
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Effective January l, 1962, the $1 million limitation was cut to
$500,000.

16

Thus with greater participation and more accurate report-

ing, future statistics shou ld present a truer picture.
Table 8 shows for the fiscal years 1957 through 1963, the t ota l
receipts of large concerns for military contracts and in turn, the
amounts these concerns paid to small and other business firms for subcontract work.

Over the seven- year period, large concerns paid sub-

contractors 49.6 percent of the total amount they recei ved on military
contracts, and small business firms received 37.3 percent of the total
subcontracts.l7

Th e Subcontracting Program

Prime contractors, thos e who have direct contracts with the

government, like· any other business, uti liz e a portion of their recipts
to buy goods and services from other firms.
are basically of two types:

The transactions involved

The purchase of materials and parts at

fixed prices, transactions that are similar to those in

the rest of

the economy; and the purchase by subcontract of subsystems.

The latter

generally involves a continuing contractual relationship between purchaser and se ller for a development effor t rather than the sale of a
finished off-the- shelf item.

These subcontracts involve the develop-

ment of such items as air conditioning units, ground handling equipment,
test equipment, and guidance systems.

These items usually require an

extensive development effort, and are especially designed for a particular
1~~.
17Th~.
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weapons program, and usually require engineering skills that the prime
contractor does not normally possess.l8
It is generally recognized that the growing technological complexities involved in producing military and space it ems for the government are reducing the prime contract oppo rtunities for small concerns.
Consequently, efforts are being made to expand the role of small business
in defense contracting via the subcontracting route.l9
The government has mounted an intensive program to assure that

small business has the opportunity to broaden its participation in
defense procurement through subcontracting.

The enactment of Publi c

Law 87-305 on September 26, 1961, required the enac tment of a subcon tracting program jointly by the Department of Defense, the Small Business
Administration, and the General Services Administration.

The regulations

implementing this program are contained in the Armed Services Pr ocurement
Regulations and in the Federal Procurement Regulations.
The subcontracting program requires that government contracting

officers insert clauses into contracts over $500,000 which will require
prime contractors to establish formal small business subcontracting
programs and to fi le requir ed reports to the procurement agency on
thes e activities.

Further, it provid es for periodic reports of these

subcontracting activities by the procurement agency to the Department
of Defense for monitorship purposes.

In contracts of over $5,000

estimated costs, contractors are "urged " to accompl ish the maximum

18Peck and Scherer, p. 147.
19 u.s. Senate, Select Committee on Small Business, Small Business
Administrati on --1963, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, D.C., 1963), p . 26.
Cited hereafter as Small Business Administrati on--1963.
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amount of subcontracting that they consider to be consistent with the
efficient performance of the contract.

However, no reporting to the

procurement agency is required.20
Add itionally, under this program, major contractors are required
to maintain records reflecting how many large and how many small firms
were solicited for subcontracts.; how many large and how many sma 11
firms bid; what firm received the award and, if applicable, why small
business did not receive the award.

In addition to the procurement

agency involved, the Small Business Administration has access to these
records. 21
The jointly developed subcontracting program has three objec tives:
{l)
(2)
(3)

to enab l e small concerns to be conside red fairly as subcontractors and su pplier s to the gove rnment contractors
and subcontractors;
to insu r e that the latter concerns will, at the request
of the SBA, consult with SBA through the appropriate procuring agencies; and
to enable SBA to obtain from any government procurement
agency such available or reasonably obtainable information and records concerning subcontracting by its
prime contrac tor s and their subcontractors, as SBA considers necessary.22

These objectives and their implementing directives give the SBA
a gr eat deal of altitude in the subcontracting program, but does not
provide the SBA with the authority to dictate to a prime contractor
to award a subcont ract to one business conce rn rather than another .

The SBA states:
20lb id. , p. 44.
21Katherine Johnsen, "Small Bueiness Share Grows in Contracts,"
Aviation Week and Space Technology, Mid-December 1962, p. 74.

22

small Business Administration- ~1963, p. 26.
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Our means in dealing with a prime contractor who may

fail or refuse to utilize qualified small business
sources is the power of reason. It is our task to dissuade him from continuing the practice by emphasizing
the resulting injury to a vital segment of the national
economy, and, where possiblej by pointing out resulting
injury to his own business.2
In order to increase the participation of small business con cerns in government subcontracting, the Small Business Administration

seeks to identify the types of procurement which are potentially sus ceptible to small business participation.

The role of the prime con-

tractor is to provide adequate descriptive material which clearly
identifies the product or service being purchased.

The Small Business

Administration then seeks to provide the names of those small business
firms which can provide the product or service to the prime contractor.

Each regional SBA office maintains a register of small business firms
that have listed their productive facilities for the geographic territory served by the office to aid in this endeavor.
is also centrally maintained in Washington, D.C.

This information
Thi s system e nables

the Administration to make timely referrals of small business concerns
to the major prime contractors participating in the subcontracting
program.

This facilities inventory contains the names of over 50,000

small firms and provides a clearinghouse through which the government
and large contractors may obtain information about small firms capable
of meeting their needs.24

23 rbid.
24rbid . , p. 35.
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Set-Aside Program
The set - aside program is another of the vehicles for increasing the participation of small business in the procurement of defense
supplies and services.

The set-aside program is one by which certain

contracts are set aside for exclusive competition among small business
firms to the exclusion of large business concerns.

It is authorized in

section 15 of the Small Business Act of 1958, as amended, and in the
Armed Services Pr ocuremen t Regulations, as follows:
It is the policy of the Department of Defense to place
a fair proportion of its total purchases and contracts
for supplies, research and development, and services

(including but not limited to, contracts for maintenance,

repair, and construction) with small business concerns. 2 ~

Further, it is stated that:
. . any individual procurement or class of procurements

or an appropriate part thereof, shall be set aside for the
exclusive participation of small business concerns when

such action is (i) jointly determined by an SBA representative and the contracting officer upon the initiation of
either agency, or (ii) if no SBA representative is available,
is unilatera ll y determined by the contracting officer to be
in the interest of maintaining or mobilizing the nation ' s

full productive capacity, or in the interest of war or
national defense programs, or in the interest of assuring

that a fair proportion of government procurement is placed
with small business concerns . 26
Th e emphasis placed on the set - aside program was one of the major
reasons for the marked increase i n prime contractual awards to smal l

business in fiscal year 1962 .

As shown in Table 6, this year saw the

highest perc entage of awards given to small business since 1957, as well
as the highest dollar amount being awarded.27
25 Armed Services Procurement Regulation l-702 (Washington, D.C . ,
1964), p. 144.1
26Armed Services Procurement Regulation l - 706.1 (Washington, D.C.,
1964)' p. 148.
2 7The Role of Small Business in Government Procurement--1962 - 63,
p. 3 .
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The use of small business set- asides was sha rply inc reased,

reaching the highest level in five years.

The increase • from $1.21

billion in 1961 to $1.77 billion in 1962 in total set - asides as refleeted in Table 9 was extremely sig nificant, par t icu l ar l y when t hese
statistics ref l ec t a 46 . 3 percent

incr~ase

in these t ypes of awards

by the Department of Defense to small business.28

Table 9.

Set - asides agreed to and set-aside procurement awa r ds

Total ( agreed to )
Department
of Defe nse
Civilian
agencies
Total (awards)
Department
of Defense
Civilian
agencies

Fiscal year
1961

Fiscal yea r
1962

Percent
i n crease

$1 ' 64 7 ' 651' 7 5 1

$2,295,074 , 782

39.3

1 ,434,565,963

1' 965 , 465 ' 648

37.0

213' 085 ' 788

329' 609' 134

54.7

$1,216,801,518

$1,773,803,530

45.8

1,052,414,134

1,539,174,044

46.3

164,387,384

234' 629,486

42.7

Sou r ce: U. S. Sena te, Se l ec t Committee on Sma ll Bu s ine ss , Th e Ro l e
~11 Bu s ines s in Gove r nme nt Procur ement - - 1962- 1963, 87 t h Cong. ,
2nd Sess. 196 2 (Washi ng t on, D.C., 1962), p. 11 .

28

Ib i d . , p. 4 .
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Also noteworthy is the fact that the awards resulting from t he
use of set-asides represent 36 percent of the total awards awarded by
the Department of Defense to small business concerns during fiscal
year 1962. 29

As reflected in Table 10, the dolla r amount of the se t-

asides agreed to exceeded the quantities awarded.

This is norma l ,

inasmuch as small business concerns are not a l ways interested or capable

of performing in all contracts which are set aside for them and consequently many of them will revert to large business concerns.

Table 10.

Joint set-asides, comparison of fisca l years 1954-1962 a

Fiscal

Agreed to
Number of

year

contracts

1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962

1,621
3,924
6,075
11 >851
17,8 19
22,338
21 >592
34 >256
44,839

Awarded
Number of
Amount

228,504
386,611
497,678
744,335
1,062,454
1 >142,625
1,102,935
1,647,652
2,295,075

contracts

1 >249
3,742
8,140
13 , 416
18 >149
24,800
24 >152
34,272
56> 944

Amount

$

101 ,690
193,777
344,810
552 , 573
676,749
848,570
878,169
1,216 , 802
1,773 , 804

aool l a r value in thousands .
Source: U. S . Senate, Select Comm itt ee on Sma l l Business, The Ro l e of
small Business i n 'Government Proc ur ement--1 962-196 3, 87 t h Cong. , 2nd
Sess. (Wash i ngton , D.C. , 1962), p . 11.

29

rbid.
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Increasing Competition
Providing increased opportunities for competing for defense

work to small business concerns is another objective of the Department of Defense and the Sma ll Business Admini s tra ti on.
The policy of sole source procurement o r noncompetitive procure-

ment by the Department of Defense has been the sub j ect of criticism by
Congress.

The critics of sole source procuremen t have two major com-

plaints about this policy.

First, they contend that it closes the door

to small companies in bidding for defense work; second, the lack of
competition results in added costs to the Department of Defense for
its purchases of suppli es and services.
Contract award statistics show that a l arge por ti on of defense
contract do l lars are obligated without any direct int erfirm competition .
The militar y de partments were asked to furnish a machine
tabulation of all such sole source purchases accomplished
in the period April --June 1959, a period during which total
defense expenditures amounted to $7 .3 billion. The results
of the compilation indicated that of this total, $5.6
billion was awarded noncompetitively . Needless to say, each
of these sole source actions was negotia t ed rather than for-

mally advertised.30
In addition to the effor ts in the subcont ra cting and set - aside
pr ograms, the Department of Defe nse has taken s t eps to increase competition b y reducing the amount of so l e source procurement a nd inc r easi ng

formal advertising.

By so doing, it offe r s grea t e r opportu nit ies for

sma l l business participation in defense wo rk .

Thomas D. Morris, Assist -

ant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics), made the fo ll owi ng statement

in this rega rd :

3Du . s. Senate, Select Committe~ on Small Business, Government
Pr ocuremen t--1960 , 87th Cong., l st Sess (Washington, D.C., 1961) , p. 1.
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I would like to stress the fact that there is a very important relationship between the accomplishments made in
assuring a fair share of Defense procurement to small
business, and in our objective to increase the total volume

of procurements awarded on the basis of price competition.
Last year we awarded 35.6 percent of our total purchases on
the basis of formal advertising and other forms of price
competition as compared to 32.9 percent in fiscal year 1961.
This means that approximately $650 million in purchases were
converted from a sole source to a price-competitive basis.

Our studies show that each dollar spent under price competition buys at least 25 percent more.

Hence, it can be seen

that our smaller business program serves a dual function-(1) it opens up more opportunities for small firms; and (2)
it provides an added incentive to our technical personnel
to seek out opportunities for competitive procurement with
the accompanying cost reduction benefits. Hence, there is
a double bonus which accruse from a vi~orous small business
program in the Department of Defense. 3
Research and Development
Another area in which attempts have been made to increase small
business participation has been in research and development.

However,

the results have been less than satisfying to Congress.
The following quotation indicates the feeling of the Select Committee on Small Business of the United States Senate concerning the concentration of military research and development.
Among all the forces that contribute to the growth of monopoly power, few operate more insidiously than the overloading
of g iant corporations with military production contracts in
the hands of a few score corporations (many of which while
organized, as private enterprises, are so substantially sup -

ported through defense contracts as to have the characteristics
of Government arsenals), may reduce the present profits of
qualified small companies, the even greate r concentration of
research and development contracts i n the hands of big corporations (currently about 96.5 percent) has the effect of closing
the door of existence to many sma~l compan ies .
31 The Role of Small Business in Government Pr ocurement- - 1962-1963,
p. 5.

3 2Eleventh Annual Report, p. 5.
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It is estimated that every research and development dollar spent
generates $7.00 worth of sales in about five years.

It is also stated

that those companies not having active research and development programs
are courting disaster.

Since the government pays for 60 percent of all

research performed by American industry, ·the conclusion is reached that
concentration of research contracts in the laboratories of large corporations guarantees them that they will enjoy a formidable headstart over
smaller companies in the development of consumer products which are
often the inevitable by-product of military research contracts.33

This

committee goes on to state:
With this basic reality in mind, it may well be that those
in the Defense Department of good will toward small business,
urged and aided by their counterparts in the Small Business
Administration, will want to develop a joint crash program
to break the monopoly of research and development contracts
now so tightly held by the Nation ' s corporate giants.34
Table 11 shows the extent of awards for research and development
to small business.

Despite the interest shown by the Senate Small Business

Committ ee and the various programs established by th e Department of Defense
to increase the placement of res earch and development contracts with small
business, these actions have not been too effective.
dollar value increase

Although an absolute

in contract awards to sma ll business for research

and development work went from $161.3 million to $197.7 milli on between
fiscal years 1961 and 1963, along with an increase in the percentage of
total awards from 2.9 percent to 3.5 percent, the percentage dropped to
2 .7 percent for the first nine months of fiscal year 1964. 35
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35Hilitary Prime Contract Awards and Sub cont ra ct Payments, p. 24.
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The Department of Defense has a program which requires that
contracting officers consider small concerns for research and develop-

ment work.

I f small business is not solicited, a statement to this

effect must be included in the procurement fi le setting forth the reasons
for non-soliti cation . 36

Consid era ti on was given to using set-aside pro-

cedures for the purchases of research and development by the Department
of Defense; however , the following statement reflects their position on
this matter.
We have concluded that should the small business set-aside
procedure be adopted for R and D contracts, the Government
would rule out of consideration large firms whose potentially
superior competence (in the set-aside cases) would be lost to
the military services in the development of military items.
Therefore, we believe that it i~not in the interest of the
Government to adopt the set-aside technique in this extremely
important area of procurement.37
This official position of the Department of Defense would appear
to rule out any appreciable increase in the future

on the amount of

research and development awards to small business.

Organized Aid to Small Business
Overseeing the efforts of the Departm ent of Defens e and the Small
Business Administration to provid e a larger share or defense dollars to
small business concerns is the Select Commit t ee on Small Business of the
U.S.Senate and the Select Committee t o Conduct a Study and Investigation
of the Prob lems of Sma ll Business of the U.S. House of Representatives.
Both groups are unanimously authorized each session of Congress to
36The Role of Small Business in Government Procurement --1 962-1963,
p. 8 .
3?Ibid. Statement by Thomas D. Morris, Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Installations and Logistics).
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continue their activities on behalf of small firms.

Annual public

hearings before the Senate group focus attention on government procurement policies programs and projects aimed at strengthening the position
of small business .

In addition, both committees have staffs which can

handle the individual problems of sma ll firms on an individual basis
during the year.38
The Small Business Administration, which exists for the sole
purpose of aiding and protecting small business, is one of the fastest
growing agencies in Washington.

The following figures reflect the growth

of personnel in this agency since fiscal year 1959 and October 31, 1963:39
October 31, 1963
June 30, 1962
June 30, 196 1
June 30, 1960
June 30, 1959

3,258
3,140
2,633
2,244
2,013

Noteworthy, is the growth between 1961 and 1962 (fiscal year 1962).
This was during the period when the Pr esident first began to give emphasis
to the sma ll business program.

Pers onne l of this agency are located all

over the coun try--750 being located in Washington and the balance in the
field. 40

A budget of $35 million provides this group with the means for

the fu l fillment of its objectives.41
Cooperating with the Small Business Administration is the wide flung organizationa l resources of the Department of De fense .

The Def ense

Department has a Directorate of Small Business which has equal status with
the Directorate for Procur emenL Poli cy and the Directorate for Proc urement
38 11 Small Business Shar e Crows in Contracts, " p . 74.

39small Business Administration--1963, p. 8.
40 "Sma ll Business Share Grows in Contracts," p. 75 .
41 small Business Administration--1963, p. 8.
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Management under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations
and Logistics.

These agencies, between them, formulate policies govern-

ing the total procurement activities of the Department of Defense.

In

addition, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Defense Supply Agency each have
small business offices at the Pentagon.
To carry out the program formulated in Washington to aid small
business, the defense establishment has small business specialists
located at 500 depots, commands, and other installations that engage
in procurement throughout the country.4 2
Further, the Commerce Department publishes the Commerce Business
Daily which tells the small businessman where to look for business.

It

lists:
Products and services which individual government procurement offices are planning to buy currently; proposed procurements by all government agencies; subcontract opportunities by defense prime contractors, and prime con tra ct awards,
which furnish leads to possible subcontract possibilities.43
All in all , the government's organi zat i on and programs for provid ing guidance, and assis tance in obtaining a greate r share of the defense
dollar are extensive.

42

"Small Business Share Grows in Cont r acts, " p. 75.
4 3Ibid.
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CHAPTER V

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
The Role of the Government
Society is living through an accelerating scientific revolution
which is leaving no part of our culture untouched.

The federal govern -

ment is playing a central role in this revolution through its participation in and sponsorship of research and development in all areas.

The

vast expenditures of funds for this purpose have had myriad effects.
Changes are being wrought which affect our personal lives, our
institutions, and our industries.

Numerous benefits have accrued to the

economy resulting from this research, although the major portion has been
related to military projects.

Completely new types of organizations have

been created as a result of government-sponsored research.

Further,

development-oriented indus tries, such as aircraft, missiles, and electronics, now receive greater attention than the traditional large
manufacturing industries such as automobiles, machinery, and stee 1.

Since the United States Government plays such a central role in
this scientific revolution which affects our social, economic, and

political lives, it is essential that the impact of government participation and policies in research and development be fully understood.
Research has become so large, that if it were to be classified as an
industry it would rank among the top twelve manufacturing indust ri es .
There are 350,000 people employed in research and development- - close to
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65 percent of the number employed in the auto industry. 1

It certainly

ranks with big industry, considering the billions expended for research
each year.
Table 12 reflects the increasing government expenditures in all
areas of research, particularly for national defense which consumes over
65 percent of the federal research dollar.

Table 12.

Federal expenditures for research and development, fiscal
years 1953-1963 {in millions of dollars)

Fiscal
year

National
defense 8

Other

Total

1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963

2,832
2,868
2,979
3' 104
4,027
4,463
5,048
6,639
7' 719
7,820
8,572

269
280
289
332
433
523
744
1,103
1,572
2,424
3,793

3,101
3,148
3,268
3,435
4,460
4,985
5' 792
7' 742
9,291
10,244
12,365

aAmounts included in this table under "National defense" for the

Department of Defense have been compiled from the best available
summary data to provide maximum possible comparabi lit y for the
years shown.
Sour ce: Report t o the Pr esid e nt on Government Contracting for

Research and Development, April 30, 1962.

l"Research: Leave How Much to Uncle Sam7"
ber 23, 1961, p. 53.

Business Week, De cem-
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Table 13 indicates th e sources and distribution of funds for all
research, government and private.

It further identifies the amount of

research being performed by basic g roup s.

These statistics reveal that

about two-thirds of all research and devel opment expenditures are made
by the federal government; but that it performs only 15 percent of the

Table 13.

Summary information concerning the distribution of national

research and development fundsa

By source of funds

National research and develoement ex2enditures
(in millions of dollars)
Fiscal years
1954
1955
1959
1960
1961

Federal government

Industry

$2' 740
2,240

$3,070
2,365

$7,170
3,620

130

140

190

Universities and
university research
centers

Other not-forprofits
Total

$8,290 .
4,030 '
200

$9, 220
4,490
210

40

45

90

100

120

$5,150

$5,620

$11 '070

$12,620

$14' 040

950
4,070

$1' 730
8,300

$1,830
9,550

$2,060
10,500

450

480

840

1,000

1,200

100
$5,150

120
$5,620

200
$11,070

240
$12,620

280
$14,040

By performer
Federal government
Industry
Universities and
university r esearch
centers

Other not- forprofits
Total

$

970
3,630

$

aThis table illustrates the growth of the total national expenditures
for research and development and their distribution among basic types
of performing institutions and types of functions.
~:
Report to the President on Government Contracting for Research
and Development, April 30, 1962. Prepared by the Bureau of the Budget
(Washington, D.C., 1962), p. 277.
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nation's total research and development in its own laboratories while

expending approximately 20 percent of its own outlays in federally-owned
laboratories.

About two-thirds of the federal expenditures are made

through contracts with industry and over 10 percent with university
and other non-profit organizations.

There was an increase of 236 perc e nt

in government-sponsored r esearch from 1954 until 1961, with a corresponding increase of 173 percent for all research during the same period.
To bri ng these figures up-to-date in the fiscal year 1963, a
total

national expenditure of $16 billion for research and development,

$12 billion was for government objectives and only 25 percent went to
the civilian economy .

The federal research effort is programmed at

almost $15 billion in 1964 with $7.6 billion for defense and $4.2
billion for the National Spac e Agency, which is to a great exte nt related to the defense effort and which can be identified with aircraft

(

and missile technology.2,
Balance between . Defense and Civilian Purposes

Industry, represented by the U. S. Chamber of Commerce, feels that
these expenditures indicate that there is a serious imbalance between re-

search for national defense and research for civi l ian purposes.3
2u.s. Congress, Subcommittee on Defense Procurement, of the Joint
Economic Committee, Impact of Military Supply and Service Activities on
the Economy, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, D.C., 1963), p. 162.
Helge Holst, corporate counsel for Arthur D. Little, Inc., an industrial
research firm representing the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, appeared before
the Subcommittee on Def ense Procurement, Of The Joint Economic Committee
and submitted a prepared statement and provided other testimony. Cited
hereafter as Holst.
3Holst, p. 162.
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The Chamber do e s not d eny t he need for st r ong military defense,
but feels that a greater balance is necessary between research and
development expenditur e s devoted to military and civilian pu rp oses.
The Chamber's representative exp la ined that research a nd development
contr ibut e substantia ll y toward the goa l s of ful l employme nt and a ri sing
standard of living, with its contribution of new products, new industries,

and new processes which increase productivity, thereby providing employment for an expa nding force and maintaining costs within limits, which

make the r esulting outflow of goods and services wid ely avai l able .

How-

eve r, there is overwhelming evidence which indicates that the 1 imited
research and developmen t resources have been increasingly diver t ed from
civilian indu s tri a l purp oses t o primarily military a nd space programs.
Wi th on ly 25 percent of research a nd development expenditures going
toward s civilian-oriented programs, the national Chamber asserts that
the ex t e nt of t his d ive rsion be rec ognized .

It is considered very ser-

ious tha t the Un ited Stat es effort in civilian- oriented resea rc h i s well

be low that of other major industria l coun tr ies (su ch as J apa n , West Germany, a nd othe rs).

Pr op o rtiona ll y, the United States research and

development talent devoted to civi l ian ind ust r y and comme r ce is only
half th a t of West Germany.

I t is asserted by the United Stat es Chamber

of Comm e r ce that this is a potential cause of lagging employment and a
deterrent to increased productivity.

The Chamber continues and a r gues s trongly for national policy
to have as its ob j ective recognition of the r ela tive importance of a
sound economy as weighed against t he prestige value of a space exploration or overkill in military def ense .

Considering that the government's
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needs must absorb a substantial portion of the nation's research and
development, the Chamber asks two questions " . . . in what ways can

this be handled so as to produce minimum diversions from the private
sector?"

And ''What unnecessary practices have contributed to the

present situation and how might they be changed? "4
What is it that needs changing?

According to the Chamber, govern-

ment contractual policies regarding research performed by private organizations tend to isolate this work from the civilian industrial effort,
thereby increasing costs and requiring larger amounts of personnel, both
scientific and other.

Further, the great amounts of research and develop-

ment being accomplished in government laboratories by government personnel

shows up in a duplication of closely related projects and also in duplicate
staffs and facilities.

Joint use of personnel and facilities between the

various services in the Department of Defense do not often use common

facilities.

The limited resources of the nation cannot afford this

luxury of duplication:

" . . . ' single ' service or shared operation of

a single facility would promote efficiency and achieve a greater degree
of transfer of technology and experience from one project to another. ' ~
Duplication of Research
An opposing view to this matter of centralization of research and
elimination of duplication in research and development efforts is founded
on the basis that because of the uncertainties involved, some duplication
is desirable and there has been, at times, too little duplication.
4 rbid., p. 163.
5 r bid., p. 164.

The
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state of the art has not yet reached the point where precise answers

can be given as to how much duplication there should be.
a

"There is

strong case for some duplication in the development of critical

weapons systems, despite their great cost, because of the disastrous
consequences if the one horse that we back runs last."6

Depending

upon the magnitude of the problem apd the uncertainties of the development, several approaches may be necessary--perhaps completely independent approaches using competing contractors.

There should also be

greater duplication, the less it costs to duplicate.

As a result of

the uncertainties and when duplications are relatively inexpensive, a

great deal of "temporary" duplication is desirable.

As more knowledge

is gained and the more expensive stages of development are reached, the
number of routes t o be followed shou ld be decreased.
Related to too little duplication is too little competition.
Either is possible without the other.

Duplication without competition

occurs when multiple paths are taken by the same o rgani zation.

Competi-

tion without duplication may occur, as an example, when the Army and the

Navy compete for the budget dollar, even though they may never develop
the same type of weapons.

As in any competition, there is a certain

amount of s timulation to those engaged in research in the fear that
another laboratory will beat it to the object ive.

Competiti on

the military services has proven beneficial in th e past.

between

The criticisms

of duplication and competition are based on a fundamental misconception
of the nature of research and development.

The treatment of the uncertain

6charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of Defense
in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Pr ess, 1960),
p. 249 .
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as certain is responsible.

Suppression of competition and

luplication

occurs because

Particular duplications are obviously wasteful from the
vantage point of hindsight, apparently unaware that
duplication is a rational necessity when we are confronted
with uncertainty and that competition is our best protection against bureaucratic inertia. 7

Military research and development is being criticized for precisely those characteristics which it has in common with research and

development in the privat e sector.

Res earch and development in the

American economy is uncoordinated, without central planning or direction

and with a great deal of duplication and rivalry.

And with the aid of

hindsight, one can find waste.S
Benefits o( Military Research to the
Civilian Sector
ln regard to waste, it is indeed a waste if the secondary benefiLs

of military research and development as applicable to the civilian economy
are not full realized; however there have been significant benefits gained

by the privat e sector from military research in many areas.

The r esea rch

and development efforts in aircraft and engines have certainly spilled
over into benefits for commercial aviation.

There are many good examples,

and if these benefits both direct and indirect, coul d be totalled, the
amount would be staggering.
Military research and development is like any other research and
development in that i t seeks new knowledge, techniques, and products.

7Ibid., p. 256.
Sib id. , p. 25 7 .
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It differs from civilian research and development only to the extent
that its search is for knowledge, techniques, and products to meet
military needs .
actual.

This distinction, however, is much less real than

This is so because the term "military" is made up of a com-

plex of activities, many of which have civilian counterparts.

The

Armed Forces embody activities which are very similar to, or identical

with, numerous civilian activities--although the objectives differ.9
It therefore follows that military r esearch and development results
in findings which are of great value to the economy at large .
An early example of such a benefit may be traced back to the
contract between Eli Whitney and the United States Government to develop
a system of manufacturing interchangeable parts for the produ ction of
firearms.

The techniques deve loped then were soon picked up by civilian

industry.

These developments were basic to the continuation of the in-

dustrial revoluti on at that time and mass production techniques were
furthered by Whitney's work .

Although this development would have come

sooner of lat er- -it did come sooner because of a military requirement,

with the resultant benefits to society at large.
A more recent example of a benefit with a transf e ranc e value from

military research and development to the civilian sector is the development of the electronic computer .

The present computer industry is the

direct result of Army sponsored research during World War II.

Computers

were initially developed to calculate trajectory and firing tables because
these calculations exceeded the capabilities of the men and machines of
9Herbert E. Striner, ~~··Defense Spending and the U.S. Economy,
Staff Paper, ORO - SP-57, Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins
University, Vol. I, June 1959, p. 16.
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the Ballistic Research Laboratories of the Ordnance Department, Unit ed
States Army.

As a result of a need for greater speed and accuracy in

these computations, a contract was made with the University of Pennsyl-

vania to develop an appropriate type of electronic computer.

By 1946,

a machine was produced and installed on the Ballistic Research Laboratories.

Today the computer industry is rapidly expanding and machines

are being applied to problems of industry, universities, and government

agencies .

In addition to increasing productivity, work once regarded

as impractical to perform becomes a daily occurrence with the use of
the computer.

The actual pay-off of the original $400,000 investment

in research and development in 1942 by Army Ordnance cannot be measured
since so many fields are affected, directly and indirectly. 10
Even a later example is the adaptation of the research performed
to develop the KC-135, an aerial refueling cargo vehicle to the nation's
first jet airliner, the present Boeing 707.

It is no more than a modi-

fied KC-135 which is used in support of the B- 52 weapon system.

Similarly,

the current expenditures in research and development for modern weapons

systems have far-reaching implications f o r advancements in science and

technology in the civilian sector.
at this time

The benefits cannot be calculated

but the advances will surely have a dramatic effect on

our way of life.
Primary Benefits of Military Research

Apart from these benefits, the number one benefit to be derived
from military research and development is a defense posture which is in
consonance with our national policy.
10 Ibid., p. 19.

It is doubtful that our scientist -
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engineers resource base would be as large as it is without the incentive

of military r esearch and development.

To assert that this limited r e-

source i s being diverted f r om the civilian economy t o it s detriment and
may be a pot ential cause of la gg ing employment and a deterrent to inc reas ed productivity is to convey the idea that the quantitative costs
and side effects of having the government do more of our shopping are
known.

A bet t er understanding of these economic pr oblems and implications

for res ea rch and development and military budgets a s a whole along with
the entire complex of related domestic economic problems is required .
" . . . let us not be so bemused by good but incomplete economic the ory
about these indirect costs that we run undue risks with national

security. ooll
Th e Need for Comp e tent Personnel
Still in the area of the effective utilization of personnel and
facilities are the policies related to how much res earch and development
the government itself will co ndu ct with its own personne l and within its
own f ac iliti es and how much it will co ntract out.
by industry.
volved.

The latter is favored

In a measure this is r e lated to the typ e of research in-

This has bee n classified und e r five basic categories:l2
l.

Fundamental research

2.

Supporting research or ex plorat ory development

llHitch and McKean, p . 81.
12 u.s. House of Repres enta tiv es , Subcommittee of the Co11111ittee on
Government Op e rations, Sys tems Development and Management, Part I, 87th
Cong. 2d Sess . (Washington , D.C ., 1962), p. 204. From the Report to the
Presid en t on Government Contracting for Research and Development, April 30,
1962. This report was prepared by Da vid E. Bell, Director, Bureau of the
Budget, and is known as the "B e ll Report . " It has been made a part of
these Hearings and is reproduced in its entirety on pp. 191-337. Cited
hereafter as the "Bell Report."
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3.

Feasibility studies, operations analysis and technical
advice

4.

Development and engineering of products, processes or

5.

systems
Test and evaluation activities

These areas may overlap and there is no clear-cut method of
deciding whether to contract out or use government personnel or facilities for any of these particular types of activities.

A major criteria

for deciding this issue should be based on "getting the job done effectively and efficiently with due regard to the long term strength of the
nation's scientific and technical resources. 1113

The management of research and development programs is difficult
for the government--regardless of whether the work is being accomplished
contractually or organically in government facilities .

Decisions con-

cerning the type of work to be done, when, by whom, and at what cost
are decisions which must be made by government officials.

Fu 11- time,

competent government officials responsible to the President and Congress
must be in a position to manage these programs and evaluate the results
therefrom.

These basic management funcations cannot be transferred to

the contractor if proper accountability for the performance of public
functions and for public use of funds is to be maintained.

This does

not imply that detailed su pervision of each research and development
task by government officials is necessary- - delegation of responsibility
for this detailed administration to those performing the work is essential to its efficient execution.

However, recent years have seen

instances, particularly in the Defense Department, where contract

employees have been permitted to exercise functions which belong to
top government officials in research and development activities. 14
l3rbid. , p. 214.
l4lbid.' p. 215.
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Recognizing this, it is essential that the government have the
best qualified technical and scientific personnel to manage research
programs.

Due to the relatively low compensation received by government

personnel as compared to those in private industry, it has been difficult
to obtain and maintain the managerial competence which the government
needs to manage its research and development programs.l5
The need for higher pay for government personnel performing these
tasks has been recognized.

Higher average starting salaries, and greater

annual salary growth over a longer period of time are offered by private
organizations.

Consequently, the average empl oyee in private industry

will have a highe r maximum salary expectancy.

The difference in favor

of the average industrial employee is so g r eat , that at a ny time during
employment, the average emp l oyee working for a government contractor
having a bachelor's degree can expect to receive a considerably higher
salary than the average gove rnment employee with a doctor's degree.
Further advantages of private employees are ref lected in cash bonuses,

stock options, etc.

This has resulted in the necessity of paying

scientists and engineers working on purely civilian effo rts salaries
comparable to those being paid to the others doing work in government
programs . 16

This rai ses the cost of research and devel opment for all

purpos es.

lSibid ., p. 280.
l6Hols t, p. 163.
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Non-Profit Organizations
Further, in relation to salaries, the creation of non-profit
organizations under government auspices for research purposes is

viewed with great criticism by some members of Congress .
These non-profit organizations contract either
entirely or almost entirely with the federal government.
The employees of such organizations are paid indirectly by
the taxpayers to the same extent as employees under civil
service are paid directly by the taxpayers. The pertinent
major difference is that their pay is higher. Laws have been
enacted by the Congress to regulate salaries of civil service
employees. No such laws protect the taxpayers from the payment
of excessive salaries to the employees of non-profit organizations with government contracts. To a considerable extent,
the use of contracts with non- profit organizations is merely
a subterfuge to avoid the restrictions of civil service
salary scales.l7

To promote operations research and other analytical services by
contract to the Air Force, the RAND C9rporation was established after
World War II.

Other organizations modeled after RAND to provide similar

services have also been established.

Another type of organizational

setup, generally not-for-profit but sometimes for profit, has been created
to furnish the government with "systems engineering and technical direction"
and to provide other services.

Typical examples are the

Aerospace Corpor-

ation, the MITRE Corporation, the Systems Development Corporation, and
the Planning Research Corporation.

The Air Force is the major user of

the non-profit type of organization--predominantly the Air Force Systems
Command which is the major research organization of the Air Force.

Prob -

ably there will be greater use of more specially created , non-profit
corporations to fill this technical gap of " in-house " (government) capability.
17u.s. Congress, House of Representatives Committee on Appr opriations,
De partment of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1962, 89th Gong., lst Sess {Washington, D. C. , 1961), p. 53.
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With the advent of missile deve lopment, the Air Force found
itself unable to cope with th e complex technological problems of these
programs due to the lack of qualified officers and government employees,
although they had been successful in providing technical guidance and
expert managerial ability in the development of aeronautical systems.
It ther efore became necessary, as the tempo of ballistic missile programs and electronics and space technology increased, to turn to the
use of non-profit corporations to help provide the technical direction
and systems engineering which these new technologies and their increasingly complex weapon systems required.

The establishment of these

organizations has provided an important means for the formation of a
competent research organization for specific tasks more rapidly than
could have been possible within the less flexible administrative requi rements of the government .18
As an examp le, the Space Technology Laborat ories of the Thompson
Ramo Wooldridge Corporation was engaged to provide this capability for
the Ballistics Missile Division of the Air Research and Development
Command of the Air Force .

However, the cor porate ties of the Space

Technology Laboratories with Thompson Ramo Wooldridge, which was producing hardware for the Air Forc e, caused other industrial competitors
t o complain; and this c ulminated in a congressional investigation and

orders to the Air Force to change it s procedures in

this area .

This

resulted in the formation of Aeros pace Corporation, a new non-profit
organization, not participating in any type of production, to fulfill
this fu nction for th e Ballistics Missile Division on all new systems and
l8 "Systems Command Given New Functions," Aviation Week and Space
Technology, Sept ember 25, 1961, p. 76.
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technical areas under their control.

Similarly, Mitre Corp orat i on

was organized to provide this technical capabi lity for the electronics
area, an essential adjunct to weapons systems development.l9
Recognizing this l ack of technical capability, the Air Force in
past years has made major efforts to develop more technically trained
officers with an elaborate advanced tech nical education program in
universities, but the supp l y has been unable to keep up with the increasing requirements of the Air Force through an increasingly broad
portion of the technical spectrum.

Further, a steady stream of Lhese

technically educated officers, seasoned with Air Force operating experience, has flowed out of the service into industry . 20

Consequently,

between its increasing requ i rements and stead a t trition of experienced

officers and the low pay offered by the government to civilian sdentists and engineers, the Air Force has never been able to develop an
in-house capabi l ity beyond the barest of minimums .

Unable to develop

its own capability, it was inevitable that the Air Force wou l d have to

devise a means to manage the ever-increasing complex of technical

direction and systems engineering required in the development of modern
weapons systems.2 l

And despite the conti nuing criticisms from Congress

and indu stry, it appea r s th at the non- profit ty pe or ganization will
remain a ''way of l ife " for t he Air Force in the area of technical direc-

tion and systems engineering.

l9rbid .
20 Ibid., p. 75.
21 ster l ing J. Livingston , ''Weapon System Contract i ng, " ~
Business Review, XXXVII (Ju l y-August 1959 ) , 85 .
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Competition between Indus try and
Non-Pro f it Organizations
Industry has comp l ained of the competition of the governmentes t ab l ished non-profit orga ni zatio ns.

The Aeros pa ce Corporation in

1961 had a volume of a pproxima t e ly $65 million business f r om the Air
Force, wit h $30 million allocated to sala rie s, equ ipment, a nd ove rhead
and the remainder used for direct engineering costs of s pecific projects.

Along with the comp l aint of current compe tit ion, is the fear

of i ndu stry that ultimately the Aer os pa ce Corporation will ge t into
manufactu ring and will have a competitive advantage due to their r e sear ch ac tivi t ie s . A further comp lai nt has bee n voiced conc erning th e
higher pa y scales be ing offered to sci entist s and the l osses of such
personn e l to Ae rospace Corporation from some industrial organizations. 22
The volume of Defense Department alloca tions to t he non-profit
organizations for research has been inc reasing steadily.

The amounts

programmed for expenditure with non-profit organizations were

$112,484,000 in FY 1963, $136,292,000 in FY 1963, and $152,702,000 in
FY 1964 .

Expend itur es with Aeros pac e Corporation alone were $68,095,000

in FY 1963 and $74,210,000 in FY 1964 ,23
Maximum Transfer of Benefits to the
Civilian Sector
In addition to its complaints concerning the increasing use of
non-pr ofit or gan izati ons , industry feels that the government shou ld
22 Ri chard F. Rope r, '~issile Managers. Aerospace Corp. Stirs
Critici sm of Pe ntagon ' s Use of Non-Profit Firms, " Wall Street Journal,
Decemb e r 6, 1961 , p. 1 .
23 u.s. Congress, House, Subcommitt ee on Appropriations Hearings ,
Department of Defense Appropriations for 1964, Part 6, 88th Cong res s ,
1st Se ss. (Washington, D. C., 1963), p. 140.
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contract out for more of its research work.

1

Industry s stand is that

the government should be in a strong position to manage its research
and development programs through the use of capable and responsible
government personnel.

However, it asserts that the government should

manage only and contract for most, if not all, actual research.

Manage-

ment of research would not require staffs as large as those required
for actual research.

This would enable greater use of the private sector as opposed
to government-conducted research in its own facilities by its own employees.

The view here is that this would enable maximum transfer of

benefits from federally-sponsored research to the civilian economy.
Recognition of this need for transfer is reflected in the establishment
by the Atomic Energy Commission of the Office of Civilian Applications
and of the National Space Agency of a similar office for the purpose of
transf erring findings and technology from government-sponsored research
and development to civilian applications.

This, however, is a distrac-

tion from the primary missions of military, space,

or other objectives.

The wide scope of possible civilian applications make these efforts
problematical.24
Maximum transfer of secondary benefits from military or other
government - sponsored research may be best achieved when a contractor

is conducting the research in fields related to his regular commercial
endeavors.

Alt e rnatively, if the government is conducting the research

in-house or in a specially created institute or other quasi-public organization, direct transfer of benefits to the private sector is not possible
24

Holst, p. 164 .
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and any transfer will involve intermediate steps.

Further, the incentive

of opportunity for gain is absent, as are the means of produ c tion, dis-

tribution, and sale.

Therefore, if the transfer of benefits t o the

private sector is an objective, the choice of the organization, whether
governme nt or private, should be influenced by the se considerations.
Moreover, since it is desirable to transfer findings and technology t o the private economy from government-sponsored research,

restrictions on the use of such knowledge should be held to a minimum.
Providing the work being done for the government is well-performed, any
other advantages accruing to the contractor because of early involvement
in the work of the government should be quite incidental.

The opportunity

to obtain such an advantage might very well be held out as an incentive
for efficient contractors to undertake the project in the first place.
If such work is opened fairly to all interested competitors, there
should be no question as to the equity of the transfer of such know how;
rather it should be encoura ged in the public interest. 25
Patent Policies
Similarly, there has been widespread di scussion concerning what
policy should be followed concerning the ownership of patents resulting
from government-sponsored research and development.

Is it in the public

interest for the government to take title to these patents, d a ta, and
copyrights ?

Government justification for retaining ownership of patents

is shown by the slogan, "What the government pays for it should own."
Expressed differently, this statement asserts that because public funds
25

Ibid.' p . 165.

103

were used in the creation of the invention, then it should rightly be
the property of the public.
On the other hand, industry asks these questions.
that the government sought and paid for?
patent?

What is it

Was it a weapon system or a

Did the government receive what it contracted for?

Is the

government entitled to ask for secondary or derivative benefits?

Even

more important, if the government takes title, will it promote the public
interest?

Industry contends that the private ownership of patents has

led to their widespread use and has resulted in benefits which serve
the government and the private aim of full empl oyment, along with a
continuing flow of new and better products, services, and production
methods. 26
Opposition to the view that industry shou ld take title to patents
resulting from government-sponsored research is based on the thesis
that firms participating in this development obtain most of this work
in a non-competitive atmosphere, without the inherent risks of truly
private enterprise, but still want to use the patent system to obtain
future control of new science and technology.

The entitlement to these

patents is considered a factor in the promotion of monopoly by some
members of Congress.

'~othing

less than the futu r e of our f r ee, com-

petitive enterprise system is at stake."27
The Senate Subcomm itt ee on Monopoly has asserted that most of the
government-generated scientific knowledge is being locked up in the hands
of a few large corporations.

Other co rp orations, usually the sma ll er

26 Ibid .
27u.s. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Select
Committee on Small Business, Economic and Legal Problems of Government
Patent Policies, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, D.C. 1963), p. III.
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ones and other industries, are being denied this knowledge for immediate
and future use.

Further, many of the discoveries, major and minor, are

not being exploited by anyone--this includes cases in which both government agencies and industrial corporations hold patents which are not
being put to use.

Key government agencies, as well as corporations,

have taken control of inventions that have resulted from the use of
public funds.

Without the proper institutional arrangements, the effec-

tive dissemination of the government ' s $15 billion a year research effort
is not possible throughout society--to all companies, in all industries,
regardless of location.28
The patent policies for the different government agencies vary.
The Department of Defense, in its research and development contracts,
allows the contractor to retain title to any patents resulting from the
project with the government receiving a license to use the invention for
government purposes.

However, the corporation has exclusive use of the

development for commercial purposes .

policy.

This is known as the "license"

This differs from the " title" policy under which the National

Space Agency operates.

Under this concept, the government takes title

to the patent and licenses corporations to use them on a royalty-free
basis.

The Atomic Energy Commission also uses this concept. 29
Some members of Congress have considered modifying the law per-

taining to the patent policy of the National Space Ag ency from the " title"
to the " license" concept . 30

This has brought some protest from the

28Ibid., p. l.
29Lee E. Prest on, "Patent Rights Under Federal Rand D Contracts,"
Harvard Business Review, Vol. XLI (September -O ctober, 1963), 10.
3
Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics,

Du.s.

Amending the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 with Respect to
Pr operty Rights in Invent io ns, 87th Gong., 2d Sess (Washington, D.C.,
1962)' p . l.
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Subcommittee on Monopoly, which asserts that the unexpressed reason
for this change is that the National Space Agency fe e ls at a comp e titive
disadvantage for the attention of contractors who may also be pe rforming
research for the Department of Defense.

The Subcommittee feels that the

proper course of action is to alter the policy of the Defense Department to the "title" policy.31
Need for a Single Patent Policy
Two major steps are advocated by this group to assure the mosL
effective transfer of developments from government-sponsored research
to the civilian sector.

The first step is to have a common government

policy which will require all agencies and depar t ments of the federal
government to take title to all patents on inventions resulting from
government-financed research and development.

The second and accompany-

ing step is the establishment of an "Inventions Development Authority."
This agency would have as its ma j or functions the collection of scientific
information, its analysis, and its development, including the collection
of royalties on government-owned patents.

Without such an agency, the

retention of title by the government to a patent would not be very useful,
for patents thus retained but not put Lo use wou l d have no transfer value
insofar as the civilian economy is concerned.

For one of the current

problems is the co l lection of dust by patents resulting from governmentfunded research, either in the files of the pertinent government agency
or the drawers of a developing contractor.

A recent study indicated

that only about 13 percent of privately owned patents resulting from
3 1Government Patent Policies, p . 2.
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federa lly-financed research and deve l opment had ever been licensed fo r
use . 32
I t follows th e n that there is no systematic and ef fici ent effo rt

being made to exploit the ever- expanding flo w of te chnical information.
The l imi t ed effo rts being made to distribute information originating in
government research projects is being handled mostly by the Armed
Services Technica l In formation Agency and the Office of Technica l Services of the Commerce De partment .

These two agencies prepar e and publi sh

abstracts of research, but the effort s are rath e r limit ed.

It is for

this reason that the crea tion of an "Inventions Dev e lopment Authority"
is r equired for the purpose of developing and expl oiting inven ti ons
from public r esea rch.

This would be accomplished by making this tech-

oical information availabl e to all of industry, r ather than ha v ing it
remain in th e hands of the limit ed numb e r of large corporations engaged
in government r esea rch.

Furth e r, by charging r oya ltie s for the use of

government- owned pat ents , part of the heavy costs of public research
could be defrayed.33
The Subcommittee on Monopoly fi rmly believes:
By taking title to pat e nts wh ere its resources r ep r ese nt the prima r y contribution and by es tablishing a new
independent agency to exploit the technic al information
and inv entions generated by federally - fina nced programs,
the Government, meaning essentially the Congress since
legislation will be necessary, could insure that th e fruits
of our $15 billi on a year in r e search expend itures inure
to the benefit of th e general public.34

3 2Ibid .• p. 34.
3 3 Ibid., p. 21.
34Ibid,
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In summary, ther e are several impacts on society which may

result from the developments of government-sponsored research, depending on how quickly and freely they are made available to the economy .
The patent policy of the various government agencies do have a bearing
on these impacts.

It can be stated that there are benefits involved

in giving title to patents to contractors performing research and
development for the government.

A stimulus is provided to companies

for doing res earch and development, hence affecting res ource use and
development.

When the government performs research in its own labora-

tories, the government, of course, retains title to any resulting

developments.

In the former instance under current conditions, the

transfer to the civilian sector is much simpler and faster, since, in

addition to the fees, the company receives an added know-how acquired
on government contracts and also secures other competitive and financial

benefits through a strong patent position and unrestricted commercial
rights.

On

the other hand, there are some non-b eneficial aspects of

permitting a contractor to take title to patents developed in government
research.

The public may be excluded from or charged again for the use

of products or processes to curb competition and foster monopoly because

of the inclination of the Armed Services to contract with the larger
companies. Although the government ' s non-exclusive licenses permit fulfillment of requirements anywhere, it is only natural that the Services
tend to deal with those who have already performed satisfactory research
work. 35
35striner, p . 31 .
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In view of the expansion and changes occurring in all areas of

federal research, it appears that government policy pertaining to
patents will requ ire some changes too .

The answer is by no means

simple, and much experimentation will be necessary to find an answer.
On balance, experimentatio n toward expan sion of th e title policy with
re s pect to federal research seems warranted.

For the more widespread

and the freer the dissemination of the result s of public research t o
all potential users, the more effective will be its use .

This, too ,

would pr ovide the ad va ntage of greater competition and economic growth.
In addition to the impact on ou r public policies, the great
requirements for research and development are placing unusually high
demands on the nation ' s pool of scientific and engineering talent.
Competition for scientists and engineers, as indicated before, is becoming more intense.

In addition to the more efficient use of scientific

and technical personnel currently available, the expansion of education
and training in these areas is extremely urgent.

The university is of

course the major participant in the education of engineers and scientists.

Thes e additional training requirements, plus the amount of r eliance the
government has placed on universiti es for the accomplishment of re sea rch,
have had major consequences for our institutions of higher education.

The total impac t on a university can be sizable when federal funds provide more than half of th e research budget, as may be the case.

It is

to the problems of providing adequate numbers of scientific and engineering personnel and the impact of federal research funds on the uni versiti es
to which the next chapter will be devoted.
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CHAPTER VI
MANPOWER, EDUCATION, AND THE UNIVERSITY

Requirements for Engineers and Scientists
Research and development requirements have placed extremely high
demands on our pool of scientific and engineering manpower.

These

demands are related to the trend of the last ten yea rs of increased
federal r equirements for research and development, particularly in the
defense area for the development of modern weapons systems.

In addition

to the increased manpower requirements, which must be obtained almost
entirely through our institutions of higher education, the federal government has come to rely heavily on the nation's universities and
colleges to conduct increasing amounts of research a nd development work
in defense as well as other areas.

These two factors are having diverse

effects on American universities.

Aside from the requirements of increased federal research and
development, the newer industries such as those dealing in aircraft,
missiles, and e lectronics supporting the weapons systems effort require
a new kind of personnel mix, needing a higher percentage of scientists
and engineers.

Whereas the older type mass producti on industries re-

quire large numbers of production workers, the newer industries require
roughly a one-to-one ratio

between production workers and the scientist-

engineer group and this proportion of scientist-engineers is steadily
increasing. 1

This also intensifies the competition for these personnel.

1Bell Re port, p . 204.
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The National Science Foundation indicates there is a 6 percent
annual increase in the supply of scientists and engineers, while the
number participating in research and developmen t is increasing by 10
percent each year.

Table 14 reflects the growth of scientists and

engineers engaged in research and development from 1954 through 1960.
The development of sufficient numbers of scientists and enginee rs is
therefore very urgent for the welfare of the American economy.

Table 14.

Scie ntists and engineers in research and development by
sector 1954, 1958, and 1960a

1954

1958

1960

Total

223,200

327,100

387,000

Federal governmentb
Indus tryc
Coll eges and universitiesa
Other non-profit institutionsa

29,500
164' 100
25,200
4,400

40' 200
239,500
42,000
5,400

41' 800
286,200
52,000
7,000

Sector

aData consist of number of full-time employees plus the full-time
equivalent of part-time employees.
bLimited to civilian personnel.
CJnclude professional research personnel employed at research centers
administered by organizations under contract with federal agencies.
Source: U.S. National Science Foundation, 12th Annual Report (Washington, D.C., 1962), p. 140 .

2lbid.' p. 208.

lll
The economy relies on specialists in many fields, and there are
urgent requirements for additional trained personnel in all the fields,
but the technological challenges of the day place the heaviest demands
on engineering, mathematics, and the physical sciences.3
Shortages of scientific and engineering talent is manifested by
the intense competition among members of industry, government agencies,
non-profit research organizations, and universiti es for the services

of we ll-qualified people po ssessi ng these talents.

This was mentioned

briefly in the last chapter in regard to the government's inability to
obtain sufficient personnel to conduct its own research and the necessity of forming non-profi t research organizations for this purpose.4
The competition fo r scientific and engineering personnel may
become more intense.

The National Science Foundation points out that

requirements for these talents will increase by about 85 perc ent betwee n
1959 and 1970.
is projected.

An increased demand from 1,096,000 to about 2,032,000
For engineers, the increase projected is 90 percent--

from 783,000 in 1959 to 1,484,000 in 1970 .

For scientists, a growth

of 75 percent is expected over the ll year period--from 313,000 in
1959 to 548,000 in 1970 . 5
3u.s. White House, the Pr esident ' s Science Ad visory Committe,
Meeting Manpower Needs in Science and Technology, Report Number One:
Graduate Training in Engineering, Mathematics, and Physical Sciences
(Washington, D.C., 1962), p. 4. Cited hereafter as Graduate Training
in Engineering, Mathematics, and Physical Sciences,
4see Chapte r V, p. 97.
5u.s. Department of Labor, The Long Range Demand for Scientific
and Technical Personnel (Washington, D.C., 1961), p. 27. Cited hereafter
as Long Range Demand.
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The increase from 1,096,000 in 1959 to 2,032,000

in 1970 means

an increase of an average of 85,000 scientists and engineers yearly is
required.

In addition to this number, there will be requirements to

replace those in these professions who retire, die, or transfer to

other fields of work.

It is a ntici pated that this will average approxi-

mately 21 ,000 a year during the 19 60 ' s.

Thus, there will be a total

average requirement of 106,000 new scientific and engineering personnel
each year--85,000 for new requirements and 21,000 for replacements.
The requi r ements for engineers is the g r eatest, for it is estimated
that the demand wil l be for 81,000 new engineers each year.

Also re-

quired during this period are an av er age of 25,000 new scientis t s each
yea r .

Experience has shown tha t about 23 percent of all new en t ra nt s

into the engineering fie ld are without engineering degrees and there is
a loss of abou t 4 percent of all enginee r i ng graduates to other fields.
Based on this da t a, there will s till be a yearly aver age requirement
of 72,000 engineering graduates during this period.
This estimate of 72,000 is well above the actual number of enginee ring graduates in 1960 whi ch tot a ll ed 37,808 bachelors, 7,159 master's ,
and 786 doctor's deg r ees awarded.

An 80 percent increase in require-

ments for all fi e ld s of engineering i s pr oj ec ted between 1959 and 1969,
assumi ng that the necessary educational faci l i ties and facu lt y a r e
availa ble.

Based on this projection there would be an annual average

outp ut of 58,000 engineers making a total of 631,000 fo r the ll - year
period.

This does not meet the pr ojected demand of 72,000 per annum. 6
The r e is further evidence that the projected demand does not
6Ibid., p. 33.
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appear to he possible of fulfillment w1thin the projected time s pan.
In 1963 the number of engineering students receiving bachelor degrees
in engineering declined for the fourth straight year, although there
appears to he some evidence of slowing or reversal of this trend.

One

promising factor was the incr ease in the number of doctor's and
master's degrees awarded in the 1962-63 academic year.

However, the

engi nee r's Joint Council, through its president, stat ed that these
increases were not great enough to insure replacement of retiring
faculty and to provide upgrading of aculties and to satisfy the needs
of government and industry for engineers educated to a high level of
competence.7
If the projected demand is to he met, the proportion of freshmen enrolling in engineering needs to increase, retention rates improve,
transfers into engineering schools rise, or some combination of these

factors take place.

If none of these occur, then some of the deficit

might he made up hy an influx of a greater number of persons without
engineering degrees than the 23 percent that has been allowed ahove.B
A sim ilar situation exists in the scientist requirements.

Although an annual average output from our universities is project ed
at 80,000 degrees in various fields of science, past experience reveals
that about 70 percent of those with science degrees do not obtain work
in one of the fields of science.

To meet a projected requirement of

25,000 scientists per year during the 1960's would require an average
annual output of 83,000 science graduates which roughly approximates
7 "Classroom and Campus," New York Times, November 24, 1963, Sect.
IV, p. 7.
81ong Range Demand, p . 33.
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the 80,000 anticipated output.

However, thi s figure does not take into

account the differences in the supply and demand situation among the
various science specialties and among the different levels of education.
Employers' demands for advanced degrees indicate there may be a considerable gap between the supply of and the demand for these personnel.

In

addition, the supply-demand situation in some science specialties may
be far differ ent than that indicated for all scientists as a group.9
The Need for Quality and Advanced Training
Apart from the numbers of scientists and engineers required to
support the government's military, economic, and social objectives, the
President's Science Advisory Committee in a report t o the President,
voiced concern about the nation's needs for professional personnel
with high ability and advanced training.

The Committee urged the

adoption of four major goals in engineering, mathematics , and the
physical sciences, as follows:lO
1.
2.
3.
4.

To increase the awards of doctor's degrees to reach 7500
per year by 1970 (Table 15).
To increase the number of students who receive a full year
of graduate training to reach 30,000 annually by 1970
(Table 15).
To strengthen existing centers of educational excellence
in engineering, ma t hematics, and physical sciences, and
deve l ow new ones.
Promote wider geographic distribution of centers of
educational excel l ence.

The increased number of graduate students related to the first two
goals will require an increas in the present capacities of first-rate
9rbid., p. 34 .
10Graduate Training in Engineering, Mathematics, and Physical
Sciences, p. 6.
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Table 15.

Numbers achieved and goals for the future in graduate education in e ngineering, mathematics, and the physical sciencesa

Achieved
1950
First-year graduate
studentsb
Master ' s degree recipientsd

9

Graduate students beyond
first yearb
Doctor's degree recipients

2.1

Goals

1960

1962

1964

1966

1968

1970

17

20

30
(22)C

35

38

40

12

13

16
(l5)c

24

27

30

17

20

24
(22)c

31

36

41

2.9

3.4

3.9
4 .7
(3.9)c

5.7

7.5

aNumber of persons {thousands).
bFull-time students, defined as students engaged in at least 3/4 of the
normal work-load.
cNumbers in parentheses give expected 1964 levels, based on continuation
of past t rends .
dTaken as roughly equivalent to the satisfactory completion of one year's
full-time graduate study.
Source: U.S. White House, The President's Advisory Committee, Graduate
~ng in Engineering , Mathematics, and Physical Sciences {Washi ng ton,
D.C., 1962), p. 7 .

educational institut i ons.

The attainment of the third goal is therefore

essential if the first two are to be achieved.

This will require the

more effective use of recognized cente rs of excellence and in encouraging
and making possible their expansion.

However, this alone is insufficie nt,

for a further requirement will be to recognize and develop new "centers
of excellence. " 11
llThe President's Science Advis ory Committee considers a center of
educational exce llence as " . . . one that offe rs first-rate educational
training may comprise an ent ire institution, a department, a group of
faculty, or one distinguished man."
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The fourth goal will allow increased enrollments to be more
evenly distributed geographically.

Centers of excellence more evenly

distributed will be able to serve all geographic areas more effectively.
These educational centers serving more regions and states would stimulate and spread economic progress because recent experience indicates
that new industry has a tendency to concentrate around leading institu-

tions of science and technology.
The attainment of these four goals will require a major input
of

funds,

bothfede~aland

non-federal.

The limitations to their achieve-

ment are--availability of student support, numbers of faculty, and educational facilities .

Students with family responsibilities, faced with

a choice between reasonable starting salary and a much smaller stipend
which they may receive to pursue graduate studies, often decide they
cannot afford to select graduate study.

Those who do choose graduate

study, must often combine it with a job and extend their study over many
years.

The Committee recommends that stipends be sufficient in number

and size to attract more students into full-time graduate study, thereby
allowing a shorter interval to obtain a doctor ' s degree and making them
available for full-time professional work at an aarlier date.
An other requirement is increased funds for buildings and equip ment.

Effective graduate training requires these facilities if the

goals to accommodate increasing numbers of students are to be met.
Because the lead time is long and present facilities are inadequate to
meet increased student enrol lments, the provision of funds for this purpose is the first order of business toward attai nment of the proposed
goals .
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The achievement of these goals must not be permitted to distort
th e broad responsibilities of the universities for education at undergraduate and graduate levels, and in all academic fields, including
the s ocial science, arts, humanities, and sciences. To prevent such

distortions, the universities must be reimbursed, through an effective
prog ram, for the increased costs of increased graduate training in the
engineering, mathematical and physical sciences.

The program must

operate to supplement, but not replace, funds from other sources of
support. 12
To achieve the aforementioned goals., the Committee recommends
a national program which would provide:l3
l.

Adequate financial support for all full-time graduate
students in these three fields;

2.

Funds to cover the full costs of graduate education in
engineering, mathematics and physical sciences;

3.

Funds for physical facilities and equipment used;

4.

Funds for developing new centers of education.

It is suggested that the federal gove rnment take the lead and
perhaps provide 60 percent of the support for this program.

The remainder

would come from the states, industry, the foundations, and private donors.
The federal government has become the principal consumer of the output
of engineering, mathematics and physical sciences schools.

Large govern-

ment proj ects have greatly increased the demand for professional manpower.

However, it is insufficient for the government to establish

agencies and let contracts to accomplish these projects.

It must insure

12Graduate Training in Engineering, Mathema tics, and Physical
Sciences, p. 6.
13 Ibid.
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that high caliber and well-trained people are available to work in
these agencies and under these contracts.

Therefore, the federal

government must take the initiative and the central responsibility
for supporting this effort. l4

Magnitude of Federal Expenditures on Universities
The current federal expenditures for research and development
at universities and colleges, plus the support required by the proposed
program for expanding g raduate study and facilities are indeed large.
The costs for this program are projected to grow to $760 million for
the year 1970 (Tab le 16).

The proposed 60 percent contribution by th e

government, mainly through the National Science Foundation, for the
g raduate training program adds to an already tremendous participation
by the government in funds expenditures with ou r universities and
colleges for basic and applied research as well as for development.
The magnitude of these expenditures can be gleaned from Table 17.
It is to be noted from Table 17 that the Department of Defe ns e ranks
third in its expenditures for research and development with ed ucationa l
institutions; however, much of the expenditures of the Atomic Energy
Commission and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration are
for national securi ty purposes, which indicates that expend itures for

weapons d evelopment exceed by far the expenditures for any other single
purpose.

In any discussion related to the impact of federal research

funds on universities, it is difficult to separate the impact of ex penditures for weapons research and development per se from the cumulative

14

Ibid., p. 14.
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Table 16.

Total cost of recommended national program for graduate
training in EMP, through fiscal year 197oa,b

Fiscal year
1964

Fiscal year
1966

$185

Cost of educatiand
Construction and equipment

Student supportc

Total

1968

Fiscal year
1970

$230

$260

$285

145

180

200

225

250

250

250

250

$580

$660

$710

$760

Fiscal year

aMi llion s of dollars from al l sectors.
bNot including funds for research that is conducted as an integral
part of grad uate education.
crncludes student support in the form of research assistantships
paid out of research grants or contracts.

Stipends cover cost of

living on an 11-month basis, including allowances for dependents.
clncludes tuition and additional allowances for faculty salaries,
l aboratory operations, building maintenance, administrative services.
Source:

U.S. White House, the President 1 s Advisory Committee,

~te Training in Engineering . Mathematics, and Physical Sciences
(Washington, D.C., 1962 ), p. 11.
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Table 17.

R&D obligations to educational institutions, by selected
agency, fiscal year 1962 (estimated)

Obligations as
percentage of
agency ' s R&D
obligations

Amount
(millions of
dollars)

Percentage
distributions

$1, 283

100

12

335

26

32

324
313

25
24

54
5

180

14

13

Total, all agencies
Atomic Energy Commission
Department of Health,
Education & Welfare
Department of Defense
National Aeronautic s &
Space Administration
National Science Foundation
All other agencies

86
45

81

Sourc e : U.S. National Science Foundation, Feder al Funds for Science,
xr:-1963 (Washington, D. C., 1963), p. 20.

effect of all federally sponsored research.

Since research expenditures

for defense purposes make up the bulk of the expenditures, no attempt at
separating this impact will be made since the basic effect of all types
of federal research is similar.l5
Effects on Teaching
Many feel that the stress on research work and graduate training
is causing undergraduate work to suffer.

It is asserted that the expendi -

tures for government research, student support programs, and the comit-

ment to post-graduate support of virtually the entire source of new
15 see Table 12, Federal expenditures for Research and Development for fiscal years 1953-1963, Chap. V.
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scientific manpower are distorting the educational system. 16

By absorb-

ing the best graduates, government research projects are leaving many
universities dependent on the lowest caliber graduate students to perform
the role of instructing undergraduates.

There is evidence that the

su pport made ava ilabl e through fe llow ships, grants, and sponsored research are making it extremely difficult to find teaching assistants who
have traditionally been one of the major methods of teacing undergraduates. 17
Further, the "research outlook" of federal programs is changing
the academic scientist ' s job by de-emphasizing teaching.

Furthermore,

the emphasis on research tends to increase class sizes and thereby
reduce student-teacher contacts and helps inc r ease faculty needs, by
r edu ci ng each faculty member ' s availability for c lass work.l8
Federal research funds make up a substantial part of the operating income of universities.

The sheer volume of money affects what

they teach, how they teach, and the quality of instruction.

Apart from

the effects of the federal funds that they receive, th ey are also influenced by the total volume of federal research and development expenditures.

For examp l e, federal fu nds have created a demand for engineering

and scientific manpower which has drawn many university teachers and

potential teachers into industrial research.

These effects are not

temporary and will probably become more powerful.l9
l6Edmund K. Faltermeyer, "Cash for Colleges," Wall Street Journal,
December 6, 1961, p. 1.
l7Federal Influ ence Distorts Education, Nation's Business, Vol.Sl,
No. 3 (March 1963), p. 31.
lBrbid., P. 32.
19charl es V. Kidd, American Universities and Federal Research,
(Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard Uni versity Press, 1959),
p. 39.
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Freedom of the University
Another issue having long term effects is whether it is possible
to have strong free productive research in the university structure

when most of the money comes from federal sources .

The sheer volume

of funds creates pressures of the utmost importance in universities.

If federal financing of research leads to a loss of freedom by univer sities and by investigators, the universities and the scientific com-

munity are in a precarious position.20
There is little doubt that university research in all fields is
more extensive and in most fields of higher average quality.

However,

the amount and complexity of the total research effort does not seem
to have stifled the individual.

Large amounts of federal funds are

being provided for basic research--basic in the sense that investigations are not limited to an iarnediate practica 1 end, and that scientists

are free to pursue their own lines of investigation.

Competent scientists

using federal monies are permitted to do the research they want to do.
Basic research is better financed in this country than ever before. 21

Basic Research
Basic research has been variously defi ned .

However, the fo ll ow-

ing definition provided by the National Science foundation is considered
the most appropriate.
Basic research is that type of research directed
towards increase of knowledge in science. I t is research
where t he primary aim of the investigator is a fuller
20 Ibid . ' p. 53.
21 Ibid . , p . 211 .
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knowledge or understanding of the subject under
study, rather than a practical application thereof.22
Despite the large amount of government research funds, the
freedom of the university and individual scientists has not been
curtailed, but has, in many respects, been extended through their use.
Although the federal government may have threatened constantly to distort universities by giving greater emphasis to applied or developmental
than to basic research, the process of mutual adaptation has kept the
threat a potential one.23
Government-sponsored research administered by the various govern-

ment agencies, and in particular the Department of Defense, has had a
greater interest in applied and developmental research than in basic
research.

Since the aims of applied and developmental research meet

the requirements of the mission-related programs of national defense
and other public purposes, it was often indicated that the universities
were participating in too great a portion of this type research as compared to the amount of basic research being accomplished.
This excessive participation in applied research was felt to be

a detriment to the creation of knowledge, one of the prime aims of a
university, along with the pr eservation and transmission of knowledge.
However, American universities also have a stro ng tradition of service

to the community and feel an obligation to help gove rnments, state and
local industries, and economic and social groups solve immediate problems.

It was therefore inevitable that the federal agencies would

2 2u.s. National Science Foundation, Federal Funds for Science IX,
(Washington, D.C., 1960), p. 24.
23J. D. Millett, Financing Higher Education in the Unit ed States
(New York: Columbia University Pr ess, 1952), p. 335.
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turn to the universities and that they would respond to the needs of
the government.24
However true that the emphasis on applied and developmental
research may have been in the past, and it may also be true today,
it would be difficult to arrive at a conclusion th at basic research
is being neglected.

An examination of this area revealed that uni-

versities are getting more federal support for basic research than
ever before.

The magnitude of these expenditures with universities

is reflected in the rising expenditures of the past three years going
from approximately $415 million in fiscal year 1961 to an estimated
$578 million in fiscal year 1962, and an estimated $778 million in
fisca l year 1963.

It is also interesting to note that 52 percent of

all federal funds ($1.12 billion) for basic research obligated in
fiscal year 1962 was distributed among the universities, up from 41
percent in fiscal year 1961.25
Objectives of Federal Agencies vs.
Objectives of Universities
However, there is a degree of incompatibility between the objec tives of the individual federal agencies and those of the universities
since federal agencies have f uncti ons that are not necessarily best

discharged by acting in a way most congenial to the universities.
These objectives range from provision of the national defense to promotion of the general welfare while those of the universities are
24Kidd, p. 26.
25 u. s. National Scienc e Foundation, Federal Funds for Science
XI (Washington, D. C.,l963), pp. 127-1 29.
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education, research, and community service.

As these broad purposes

have interacted on one another since World War II, especially in
contract research, there has been much debate over the government-

university research relationship.26
One area of debate over federal project-oriented research is
that the project system transfers control of the directions which
inquiries should take from the institutions to the government agency
which approves and disapproves projects.

Projects and their sponsors

have been accused of taking away the prerogatives of the universities
performing government research under contract, and there have been
pressures to give the universities greater control over research

through the use of grants , rather than through contracts.27
The Use of Grants or Contracts
The two methods used by the government to obtain research
services are by the use of contract and the other by the use of grants.
Under the contract method, the " product" purchased is research--although
grants may also in effect purchase research.

The research contract is

considered by many an imperfect instrument for this purpose with its
concept of services purchased a nd its inherent red tape and government

administration.28
26u.s. National Science Foundation, 11th Annual Report (Washington,
D.C., 1961), p. 153.
27Paul Lancaster, "Guilding the Ivy," Wall Street Journal, February 19, 1960, p. 1.
2 Bu.s. White House, The President 's Science Advis ory Committee,
The Universities and the Federal Government, November 15, 1960, p. 8.
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The grant method is generall y considered to support research
rather than purchase it--although this distinction is more imaginary

than real.

Generally, however, grants are provided for the pursuit

of research having broad objectives rather than for a specific project.

On the other hand, co ntract s have also been l e t in recent years

for broad objectives with relatively long-time schedules for completion.
However, the use of grants allows the university greater flexibility
and freedon and there is inherently less red tape and government administration involved.

For these reasons, the grant is generally pre-

ferred. 29
Overhead Costs
One di sadvantage of the grant is that it often fails to provide
for the full cost of the research that is supported, mainly because
Congress has placed a 20 percent limitation on overhead costs in connection with research grants.

Because of this, there has been a

recent trend by some universities to refuse grants for some research

when offered, but t o accept a contract for the same research.

In the

fiscal year 19 63, the Army indicates that 57 gra nts were refused and
contracts had been awarded in lieu thereof.
refusals totaled $2,774 million.

The amount of these

During the same period, the Air

Force had 12 refusals amounting to $549,945 because of the 20 percent
limitation.

As an example. Princ eton University accepted a contract

for $270,700 in lieu of a grant for which it was allowed overhead

29 rbid.

127
rates of 70 percent based on a percentage of salaries and wages.30
From this trend it is evident that many universities do not
c onsider the governmental contractual arrangements too burdensome at

this time.

However, the number of grants being accepted by far out-

numbers those being rejected, so it is also true that most universities ' preference for this arrangement outweighs

the absorption of some costs.

the objection to

The Air Force estimated that in its

grants, th e universities absorbed overhead costs of almost $2 million
and to this extent supported the government in its research effort.3l
The major issue is the question whether the government should pay the
full cost of the research it sponsors or whether t he university should
sometimes contribute to this cost.

In addition to payment of direct

costs of equipment, materials, salaries, etc . , is the governn1ent

obligated to pay for indirect costs reasonably attributable to government financed projects?

Allocation of overhead costs is difficult and

there is no magic formula which can provide the answer .

However, the

c osts are real and any university taking on a large volume of govern-

ment research without seeking payment of indirect costs would certainly
find itself in serious financial difficulty.3 2
The Department of Defense policy in this regard is to pay full
overhead costs, if possible.

The Secretary of Defense stated, however:

30 U.S . House of Representatives, Subcommittee of the Committee on
Appropriations, Hearings,Department of Defense Appropriations for 1964,
Part 6, 88th Cong., lst Sess.{Washington, D.C., 1963), p. 116.
31Th~.

32Alice M. Rivlin, The Role of the Federal Government in Financing
Higher Education {Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1961),
p. 52 .
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This is why I say that the universities are subsidizing the Department of Defense. Because our
payments to the universities for research which they
conduct at our request arenot large enough to cover

the costs of brick and mortar.33
Benefits to the University
The acceptance of research projects, whether through grants
or contracts, is advantageous to the universities in many respects.

The incidental benefits may include enhancement of faculty and institution prestige, exploitable patents, support of graduate students
through research assistantships, and freeing of general university
research funds for departments, mainly arts and humanities, which

receive little or no federal support.

Further, institutions because

of sponsored research programs, can attract and hold better instructors and graduate students.
they cannot be priced.

These are real benefits, even though

Direct benefits are generally related to

the addition and construction of research facilities and equipment.34
Advancement of National Objectives
The total

sum of all federally-sponsored research, whether

in support of university r esearch thr oug h gran ts for proj ects no t
relevant to any spec ific goal o r a federal agency or in direct support
of a specific task of such an agency, can be considered a declaration

of national objectives and an expression of national policy.

The in-

volvement of universities in federal research is not entirely to help

3u.s.

3
Senate, Subcommi ttee of the Committee on Appr opriations,
Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1964, 88th Gong . ,
lst Ses s (Washington, D, C., 1963), p. 170.
J4Riv lin, p. 44.
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them to do more of what they wish, but to involve them in
ment of national goals established by the government.

the achieve -

When research

unrelated to a specific federal agency's objective is supported,
it is to expand the nation ' s research resources, which is a declared
national policy.

Since unrelated research and the support of a specific

research project to further a federal agency's objective both further
national objectives, these two considerations may warrant the full payment of all costs for federally sponsored research despite the benefits
accruing to the university in pursuing such research.35
Protection for the University
An opposing view to the full payment of all costs, is based
on the view that cost parlicipation by the university is essential
in order to protect the university from undue federal influence or
control, and further because of the benefits received--both direct
and indirect.

It is thought that through university cost partici-

pation, the faculty members involved

in the research and the institu-

tion will be in a stronger position to resist any effort on the part
of the federal agency to control that research.

In such a situation,

the fact that the university paid 10 to 20 percen t of the research
cost would not alter the situation very much.

Compulsory cos t partici-

pation could indeed restrict the freedom of the university and its
faculty members.

I n some instances this cost participation in federal

research might reduce the volume of research supported entirely by the
university.

The only major protection for a university engaged in

35 Kidd, p. 93.
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federal research to retain a substantial degree of freedom in its
research program is to obtain a substantial part of all programs
from non-federal resources.

Further, when performing federal re-

search, it must insist on favorable terms and conditions which will
allow them to retain a high degree of control of their own affairs. 36
The breadth of federal authority and the breadth of the missions
of the federal agencies and the amount of money available to finance
research in universities are in many respects a protection to them.

This money has been provided for virtually all kinds of research.
This has resulted in reduced tendency for the possibility of university
control by federal agencies.

Exertion of individual pressures by

agencies to increase the amount of research of interest to them has

resulted ln greatly nullifying the number and variety of pressures
from all agencies combined .

Similarly, the large number of agencies

which support work, often of the same kind, protects scientists and
universities.

The principle of diversity of research support has been

adopted by the government and this provides the competition so necessary
for protection.37
The major threat to the freedom of universities is not the
exercise of arbitrary authority of government bur eaucrats but the
effect that federal funds have on the universities in resolving prob lems such as:

(a) exertion by universities of countervailing forces

against the pressure to expand the physical sciences; (b) the impli ca tions of expanding the volume of research on the capacity of the
36Ibid.
37Ibid., p. 213.
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universities to teach the impending wave of students; (c) how to
attract and retain teachers with research talent when competing with
industry, substantially supported by federal money; and (d) how to
withstand the temptation to accept federal funds which would divert
them from their primary functions.3 8

38Ibid., p. 228.
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CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The Unpredictability and the Constraints
The large expenditures of the United States for the development
of modern weapons systems along with outlays for their logistics support, manning, and deployment have had a major impact on the nation-its economy, its institutions, and its people.

Certainly very few

activities, if any, have remained unaffected.
A large segment of American industry has been affected because
development of modern weapons systems is conducted in an environment

that is unique in character and quite different from ordinary commercial activity.

The control of development time, ultimate costs, and

the quality of a major weapons system has been fraught with unpredict ables.

The fact that major development programs have suffered cost

escalations of 200 to 300 percent and schedule slippages of one to
three years - -when measured against original targets -- is well known
to government and industrial managers.

Since much of the effort

invo l ves research and development activities, whose ou t comes have

been generally unpredictable, the uncertainties have existed to a
greater degree than in the ordinary industrial env ironment.

Fur-

ther, the development which is sought attempts to discover a new and
different technology and demands an order of magnitude of imp rovement
over anything achieved before.
Ad vances in technology may make the program obsolete and thus
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cause its termination.

Changes in defense policies, budget changes,

changes in officials, and change in the intelligence of enemy capabil ities, among others, may cause the alteration or even the cancellation

of the program.

These uncertainties have introduced a large element of

uncertainty for those engaged in the

we~pons

business.

In addition to the risks introduced by these uncertainties, the
weapons market is also peculiar to the extent that the government is

the sole purchaser of weapons systems.

The weapons market bears little

resemblance to the consumer or commercial markets because the govern-

ment, as the buyer, prescribes the product it desires rather than the
entrepreneur offering specific products for sale.
Because the government is the sole buyer of weapons products
and can exercise the power of a monopsonist and because the nature and

performance of the product is considered so critica l, constraints have
been placed upon the defense indu stry which are not customarily found in
private industry.

Some contracts for weapons systems specify not only

what is to be produced, but also how and with what materials, how much
subcontracting is to be done, and who the subcontractors are to be.
Government personnel in residence at the industrial site constant ly
monitor all aspects of development, production, and costs in ma ny cases.

The government- ind ustrial relationship in development programs is quite
unlike any situation in

the civilian sector.

Although industry would

lik e to have this relationship relaxed to some extent, it is unlikely
that this will occur in the fore~eeable future because of the complexity
and performanc e requirements of the product, the high costs ihvolved, and
because of the many uncertainties which necessitate constant changes in
the product.
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Although these uncertainties pertaining to time, cost, and
quality outcomes have existed for an extended period, the current view

by the Department of Defense is that these problems have been due mainly
to inadequate planning and treating all develo pmen t projects in an
identical manner.

Consequently the basic conce pt of dev e lopment work

has been reorganized.

This concept briefly requires that before any

large scale development work takes place that a single plan be established
which defines what is wanted, what the design will be, when it is wanted,
how it is to be built, and the cost of the program.

Further, a descrip -

tion of the management techniques to control the project is also required.
This concept is known as "project definition."

Through the use of "proj ect definition" the increased use of incentive type contracts is possible.

By providing con tractors with

incentives for increased profits, it is hoped to improve performance
factors of the end product, improve deliveries, and reduce costs- - those

things which have been the major pr oblems in the past.
In conclusion, the adoption of "project definition," with its

precise establishment of the pr ogram, including the management techniques
to be used in control of the program is an indication that close survei llance and con trol of development contracts will continu e indefinitely.
The Changing Geography
Over the past decade the product mix of weapons systems has
evolved from wheeled - type weapons, conventional arms and munitions, to

complex aircraft and missiles having a heavy reliance on electronics .
This has resul t ed in a major impact on a large section of the American
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economy.

The location of those industries which provide weapons pro-

ducts to the gove rnment has changed as a result of the evo l ution which
has taken place in weapons systems. The Eas t, Nor th Centra l, and Middle
Atlant ic states have been the major losers of government business in
the wea pons ar ea, whil e the Mountain and Pacific states have been the
major gainers.

These geogra phical shifts have had ma j or consequences for the
areas involved.

Those areas which have gained business as a result of

weapons contracts have often been faced with the problems of rapid growth,
while t hey have also been faced with prob lems of reduced s pending on
major weapons programs .

These reducti ons have, in many instances , re-

sulted in a high rate of unemp l oyment for specific communiti es and
cities.
There has been concern over the effects of reduced defens e expenditures not on l y for individual a r eas and industries but also for the
total economy as well.

As a result of this concern, a national study

g r oup, The United States Arms Contr ol and Disarmament Age ncy , has been
established to pre pare for the possibi lit y of reduced expenditures for
def ense purp oses.

Furth er, studies a r e bei ng conducted to asce rtain

the effects of s hifting defens e procur ement and what to do about minimizing th em.
Th e Small Business Communit y
In addition t o t he geogra phi c concentra tion of military spendi ng,
there has been a tendency for the concentration of defense contracts in
the hands of a relatively small group of large corporati ons .

This has
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raised fears of the possibility of monopoly, and Congress and the
Executive Branch have insisted on the establishment of programs within
the Department of Defens e , the Small Business Administration , and other
government agencies to assure that small business receives a "fair
share 11 of government business.
The small business program encompasses numerous activities such
as financial aid, management, and other types of executive counselling,

as well as aid in obtaining government con tracts.

Aid in obtaining

government contracts was born out of concern over the impact of military

procurement upon the economic structure of the nation because of the
magnitude of the dollar volume of such buying.
This concern increased when, in

the face of mounting expenditures

for defense, the small business community continued to receive a declining share of government contracts.

The change from traditional concepts

of warfare to the concepts of the atomic and space age was changing the
procurement pattern of the services.

Henceforth, the major portion of

expenditures would be for complex missiles and aircraft and electronics
systems, while such items as subsistence, textiles, clothing, and conventional weapons would receive a lesser share.

Since small business

is unable to fully cope with the complexities of developing a major
weapons

system~

this result was inevitable.

However , the many programs

designed to provide small business with additional government business
have done much to offset the effects of weapons system procurement on
sma 11 business.
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Research and Development
Expenditures for government-sponsored research and development
approximates 75 percent of the total dollars spent for this purpose in
the United States.

With only 25 percent of these expenditures devoted

to objectives purely for the civilian sector, industry has shown some
concern that the concentration of research and development for govern-

ment objectives has caused a serious imbalance and may cause lagging
employment in the future and may deter productivity increases.

Industry

is concerned that the huge requirements for scientific and engineering
personnel for government research is diverting these scarce skills from
industry with consequent damage to the economy at large.
On the other hand, there is the belief, shared by the author,
that without the stimu lus of government-sponsored research, the resource
base of scientists and engineers would not be as large as it is.

Fur-

ther, there is much documentation to show that research for military
purposes has resulted in major benefits to the civilian sector in new
inventions, new processes, and in increased productivity.

The difference

between military research and civilian research is much less real than
actual.

Nevertheless, it is deemed necessary that the primary benefit

to be derived from mili t ary research is a strong defense posture and any
other benefits to be derived are secondary in importance.

The University
In addition to the reliance on colleges and universities to
provide the scientific and engineering manpower required for research
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and development) the government has come to depend on these in s titutions
to perform an increasing amount of research and development work in

defense as well as other areas.
It is felt that the stress on research work and the absorption
of the best graduates for government-sponsored research are l eaving
many universities dependent on the lower caliber graduate students to
perforn1 undergraduate teaching.

Further, many of the best faculty

members are so involved in research work that their services are all

but lost to the teaching mission of the university.

By reducing the

number of professors and the time of some which can be made availab l e
for teaching, class sizes are necessarily en larged, th ereby reducing
the teacher-student contact.

Further, the demand that federal research

and development requirements have made on scientific and engineering
personnel have drawn many university teachers and potential teachers
into industrial research work.

There has also been concern over the ability of the universities
to provide the required personnel for the future needs of the nation in
the scientific, engineering, and mathematics a r eas.

The need for funds

assistance to provide increased and improved facilities to the universities has been recognized and some pr oposals have been advanced for
fed era 1 aid.
Since there is already a large amou nt of federal funds going to
universities for the performance of research and development tasks for
the government, there have been fears that there is danger that the
freedom of the university is being threatened .

The large volume of

federal funds does create pressures on the universities.

However,
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there has been a diversity of research and development because of the
different types of research being sponsored by the various agencies of
the government.

Thus, the exertion of individual pressures by various

government departments to increase the amount of research of interest

to them has in a sense nullified the number and variety of pressures
from all agencies combined.
It would appear that the monies being spent by the federal government have provided the means for more extensive research and of higher
average quality.

Further, there has been no great restriction of indi-

vidual freedom in the pursuit of basic research -- that is, research
which is not confined to an immediate practical end.

Scientists are

permitted to do the research they desire to do--and wi th federal fu nds.
Although the pressures have been there, the danger of the loss of
freedom to the university has only been a potential one.

140

LITERATURE CITED
Books
Hitch, Charles J . and Roland N. McKean . Th e Economics of Def ense
in th e Nuclear Age . Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1960.
Kidd, Charl es V. American Universities and Federal Re s ear ch .
Cambridge, ~~ss . : The Belknap Press of Harvard University
Pr es s, 1959 .
Millett, J. D. Financing Higher Education in the United States.
New York : Columbia University Press, 1952.
Peck, Merton J. and Frederic M. Scherer.
Process:

An Economic Analysis.

The Weapons Acquisiti on

Boston: Division of Research,

Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University,
1962.
Rivlin,Alic e M. The Role of the Federal Government in Financ ing
Higher Education . Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1961.
Steiner, Ge orge A. National Defense and Southern California. Los
Angeles: Southern California Associates of the Committee for
Economic Development, 1961.
Articles and Peri odical s
Bookman, Geo rge B.
~.

"How Top Businessmen View the Recessi on,"

April 1958, p. 256 .

"Boom Year Seen for Electronics," Missiles and Rockets, February 29,
1960, p . 15.
Brown, Seyom. "S outhern California's Precarious One - Crop Econ omy,"
The Reporter, January 7, 1960, p. 25.
"Bust Town?"

Newsweek, August 17, 1962, p . 20 .

"Classroom and Campus," New York Times, Novermber 24, 1963, Section IV,
p. 7 .

Faltermeyer, Edmund K. "Cash for Colleges," Wall Street Journal,
December 6, 1961, p . 1 .

141
'Tederal Influence Distorts Education," Nation's Business, 51(3):31.
March 1963.
"Fight Over Military Electronics," Business Week, June 14, 1958, p. 90.
Geddes, Philip . ''Minuteman Management, the View from the Top," Aerospace Management, May 1962, p. 38.
Gershenson, Maurice J. "Shift s in California's Industrial and Employment Composition," Monthly Labor Review, May 1959, p. 513.
"How San Diego Got Trapped," Business Week, December 8, 1962, p . 127.
Johnsen, Katherine. "Economic Impact of Defense Shifts Eyed,"
Aviation Week and Space Technology, September 30, 1963, p. 28.
"Effort Urged to Ease Effect of DOD Shifts," Aviation
Week and Space Technology, November 11, 1963, p. 31.
"Small Business Share Grows in Co ntracts," Avia tion Week
a nd Space Technology, Mid-December 1962, p. 74.
Lancaster, Pa ul. "Gild ing the Ivy," Wall Street Journal, Febru ary 19,
19 60, p. l.
Livingston, Sterling J . "Weapon System Contracting, " Harvard Business
Review, Vol . XXXVII, July-August 1959, p . 85 .
''Military Electronics Will Level Off in Fiscal 1964," Electronics,
J a nuary 25, 1964, p . 18.
New York Times, June 1957-Decemb er 1963.
Preston, Le e E. "Patent Rights under Federal Rand D Contracts,"
Harvard Business Review, Vol. XLI, Sep t ember-Oct ober 1963, p. 10.
"Research: Leave How Much to Uncle Sam? "
1961, p. 53.

Business Week, December 23,

Roper, Richard F. ''Missile Managers : Aerospace Co r po r ati on Stirs
Criticism of Pentagon's Use of Non-Profit Firms," Wall Stre et
Journal, December 6, 1961, p . 1.
"Shifts in Defense Business," Financial World, January 1964, p. 3.
"Systems Command Given New Functions, " Aviation Week and Space Technology,
September 25, 1961, p . 76.

142
Reports
Blair, C. P . Economic Growth Projections for the Dallas-Fort Worth
and Houston Trading Areas, Austin, Texas: Bureau of Business
Research, The University of Texas, 1961.
Marshall, A. W. and W. H. Mecking. Predictability of the Costs, Times,
and Success of Development. P-18 21, Economics Division, The Rand
Corpora ti on, Santa Monica, California, October 1959 .
Stringer, Herbert E. Defense Spending and the U.S. Economy . Staff
Paper , ORO-SP-57, Operati ons Research Office , The John Hopkins
Universi t y, Vol . I, June 1959.
Public Documents
U.S. Bureau of the Census . Statistical Ab stract of the United States:
1963, Washington, D.C., 1963 .
U. S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy.
Hearings on Fiscal Policy Implications of the Current Economic
Outlook, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, D.C . , 1958.
U.S. Congress, Subcommittee on Defense Procurement of the Joint Economic
Committ ee. Background Material on Economic Aspect s of Military
Procurement and Supply, 88th Congress, 1st Session, Washington,
D.C., 1963.
U.S. Congress Subcommittee on Defense Procurement of the Joint Economic
Committee. Background Material on Econom ic Aspects of Military
Procur ement and Supply--1964, 88th Cong., 2nd Session, Washingt on,
D.C., 1964.
U. S . Congress , Subcommittee on Defense Pr ocurement of the Joint Economic
Committee. Impact of Defense Procurement, 86th Congress, 2nd
Session, Washington, D.C., 1960.
U.S. Congress, Subcommittee on Defense Procurement of the Joint Economic
Committee. Impact of Military Supply and Service Activities on
the Economy, 88th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, D.C. , 1963.
U. S. Department of the Air Force Regulation 23-8. Organi zation and
Mission-Field, Air Force Systems Command, Washington, D.C., 1962.
U. S. Departmen t of the Air Force Regulation 23-2. Organizat ion and
Mission-Field, Air Force Logistics Command, Washington, D.C., 1962.
U.S. Departmen t of Defense, Directive 3 200 .9.
Washington, D.C., 1964.

Project Definition Phase,

U3

U.S. Department of Defense.
D.C . ~ 1963.

Incentive Co ntracting Guide, Washington,

U.S. Department of Defense. Instruction 3200.6. Reporting of Research,
Development and Engineering Program Information, Washington, D.C.,
1962.
U.S . Department of Defense . Military Prime Contract Awards a nd Subcontract Payments, July 1963-March 1964, Washington, D.C., 1964.
U.S . Department of Defense. 100 Companies and Their Subsidiary Corporations Listed According t o Net Values of Military Prime Contract
~.Washington, D.C., n.d.
U.S. Department of Defense. Small Business Report, Small Business
Objectives for Fiscal Year 1963 and Subsequent Years, Washington,
D.C., 1963 .
U. S. Department of Labor . The Long Range Demand for Scientific and
Technical Personnel, Washington, D.C., 1961 .
U.S . House of Representatives , Committee on Appr opriations . Department
of Def ense Appropria t ion Bill, 1962, 87th Congress, lst Session,
Washington , D.C., 1961.
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Science and Astronautics.
Amending the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 19 58 with
Respect to Property Rights in Inventions, 87th Congress, 2nd
Session, Washington, D.C., 1962.
U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee f or Special Investigations
of t he Committee on Armed Services. Weapons System Management
and Team System Concep t in Government Contrac ting, 86th Cong r e ss,
1st Session, Washington, D.C., 1959.
U.S. House of Representatives, Subc ommit t ee of the Committee on
Appropriations. Department of Defense Approp ri ations for 1957,
Procurement Policies and Practices of the Department of Defense,
84th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, D.C., 1956.
U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee of the Committee on
Appropriati ons. Department of Defense Approp ri ations for 1964,
Part 6, 88th Congress, lst Session, Washington, D.C . , 1963.
U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations. Department of Defense Appropriations for 1965, Part 3,
87th Congress, 2nd Sessi on, Washington, D.C., 1964.
U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee of the Commi t tee on Appropriations. Department of Defense Appropriations for 1965, Part 3,
88th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, D.C. , 1964.

144
U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee o f the Committee on Appropri-

ations . Department of Defense App r op riations for 1965 , Part 4,
Secretary of Defense, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 88th Congress,
2nd Session, Washington, D.C., 1964.
U.S. House of Representatives, Subc ommittee of the Commit tee on Appropriations. Department of Defense Appropriations for 1965, Part 5,
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, 88th Congress, 2nd
Session, Washington, D.C., 1964 .
U. S . House of Representatives, Subcommittee o f the Committee on Government Operations. Systems Development and Management, Part I,

87th Congress , 2nd Sess i on, Washington, D.C., 1962 .
U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee of the Committee on Govern-

ment Ope rations . Systems Development and Management, Part II,
87th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, D.C., 1962.
U.S . National Science Foundation.
1961.

11th Annual Report, Washington, D.C.

U.S. National Science Foundation.
ington, D.C., 1960.

Federal Funds for Science IX, Wash-

U.S. Nationa l Science Foundation.
ington, D.C., 1963 .

Federal Funds for Science XI, Wash-

U.S. National Science Foundation .

Research and Development in Industry

1961, Washington, D.C., 1964.
U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Se rvic es and the Subcommittee on Depart-

ment of Defense qf the Committee on Appropriations. Mi li tary Pr ocurement Authorizations, Fiscal Year 1965, 88th Congress, 2nd
Session, Washington, D.C., 1964.
U. S. Senate. Conference Relating to Small Business Participation in
Government Procurement-1963, 88th Congress, lst Ses si on, Washingt on ,

D. C., published in 1964 .
U.S . Senate, Permanent Subcommi tte e on Investigations of the Committee on
Government Operations . Pyramiding of Profits and Cos t s in the
Missile Procurement Program, Part 3 (Atlas Program), 87th Congress ,
2nd Session, Was hington, D.C . , 1962 .

U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Small Business. El eventh Annual
Report, 87th Congress, 1st Session, Washington , D.C . , 1961.
U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Small Busi ness .

Government Procurement--

1960 , 87th Congress , 1st Session, Washington , D. C., 1961 .
U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Sma l l Business. Impact of Defense Spend ing on Labor Surplus Areas--1962, 87th Congress, 2nd Session,
Washington, D.C., 196 2.

~5

U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Small Business.

Report of Small

Business Participation in Government Procurement, 85th Congress,

1st Session, Washington, D.C., 1957.
U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Small Business. The Role of Small
Business in Government Procurement--1962-1963, 87th Congress,
2nd Session, Washington, D.C., 1962.
U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Small Business. Small Business Administration--1963, 88th Congress, lst Session, Washington, D.C., 1963.
U. S. Senate, Select Committee on Small Business. Small Business Act,
88th Congress, lst Session, Washington, D.C., 1963.
U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Small Business. Thirteenth Annual
Report, 88th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, D.C., 1963.
U.S. Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations. Department of Defense Appropriations for 1964, H.R. 7179 , 88th Congress,
lst Session, Washington, D.C., 1963.
U.S. Senate, Subcommi tt ee of t he Committee on Armed Services. Military
Procurement, 86 th Congress, lst Session, Washington, D.C., 1959.
U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Department of Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations and the Committee on Armed Services. Department
of Defense Appropriations, 1965 , Part I, Procurement Programs
Requiring Annual Authorization, Research , Development, Test , and
Evaluation Programs, 88th Congress, 2nd Session, Washingt on, D.C.,
1964.
U.S. Se nat e, Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Se l ect Committee on Small
Business. Economic and Legal Pr oblems of Government Patent
Policies, 88th Congress, lst Session, Washington, D.C., 1963.
U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Retailing, Distribution, and Marketing
Practices . Report to the Select Committee on Small Business,
Impact of Defense Spending on Labor-Surplus Areas, 88th Congress,
1st Session, Washing t on, D. C., 1963.
U.S . Wh i t e House, The Presid ent's Science Advi sory Committee. Meeting
Manpower Needs in Science and Technology, Report Number One:
Graduate Training in Engineering , Mathematics, and Physical
Sciences, Washington, D.C., December 12, 1962.
U.S. White House, The President's Scienc e Advisory Committee . The Universities and the Federa l Government , Washington, D.C., November 15,
196D .

~6

Other Sources
Armed Services Procurement Regulations 1-701.4, 1-702, 1-706 . 1, Washington, D. C., 1964.
Pe rsonal interview with Maurice L. Johnson, Executive for Small Business,
Directorate of Procurement and Production, Headquarters, Air Force
Logistics Command, United States Air Force. May 25, 1964 .
Press Release 561, Office of the Governor of California, July 26, 1962.

